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INTRODUCTION

A. Individual liberty; the nature of the problem; the
structure of the quest; and the relevance of the inquiry*
Any inquiry into individual liberty is at least implicitly
an ontological inquiry* Stated most universally, to be at liberty
is to be free from something and to be free for something else*
Stated in other words, any inquiry into liberty is, at the
same time, an inquiry into the nature of the context, the network
of relations, in which liberty occurs. It is also, as well, an
i

inquiry into the nature of the entity who is wfree*w

Man is the

entity whose liberty is our basic theme for analysis. Although
our inquiry does not necessarily presuppose that world and man are
created by Cod, such a view will be considered when relevant.
Within this framework of the inquiry indicated, we shall
be concerned primarily to develop and clarify lather* s concept of
individual liberty and the historical context of that concept.
To provide preliminary orientation, let us briefly indicate What we
shall attempt to show in the present essay.

Hftien used without qualification, the term world will be
used in this essay as a name for the context or network of
relations.

2

B* Luther*s contribution* the nature of his quest*
the relevance of hi© quest to the philosophic inquiry*
and the structure of his quest*
Martin Luther was above all else a man of religion. Hie
great crises of his life which outwardly Manifest dramatic
incidents and some significant contributions were to lather
himself trivial in comparison with the inner struggles of his
quest for God, Luther was, to be sure, interested in political
liberty, in the questions of natural law, scholastic!sm, humanism,
and ecclesiastical structure* At various times he lectured on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard, translated Valla*© work on the Donation
of Constantine into German, and at one point considered himself
to be a follower of Erasmus. But these questions were not his
primary concern, To better delineate Lather’s primary concern, let
/

us first consider a typical case where that concern is misconstrued.
Goethe is probably the most significant example for our purposes*
We have no idea how much we are indebted to Luther
and to the Reformation in general. We have been set
free from the bonds of intellectual obscurantism* We
have been enabled by our advancing culture to return
to the fountain-head and apprehend Christianity is its
purity. We have the courage again to plant our feet
solidly on God’s earth and to be conscious of our divinely
endowed human nature, JFo matter how much our culture
advanced, no matter how much the natural sciences expand
and grow in depth, no matter how much the human spirit is
extended, we shall never rise above the sublimity and ethical
culture of Christianity as it is reflected in the Gospels.
For as soon as the pure teaching and love of Christ is
:apprehended and appropriated as it is, man will become

3

aware of hi© greatness and freedom, and he will no longer
lay particular weight on slight deviations in external
forms#1
By Implication, four concepts are credited to Lather in this
statement which were not his primary concern or with which he
would not be in agreement!
1. "Wo have bean set free from the bonds of intellectual
obscurantism#*1 This was not, as we shall see, primary in
Lather* s quest# Luther was not anti-rational as some have
interpreted him to be. Instead, he set limits to the accomplish2
meats of reason# lb the field of man’s relationship to God,
Luther considered reason unable to comprehend God# Indeed, when
man depends on reason to approach God, it becomes his “enemy,” in
that, reason stands between man and God#
2* “We have been enabled by our advancing culture to
return to the fountain-head and apprehend Christianity in its
purity#*1 While Luther was grateful for the scholarly work of
the Renaissance and expressed his appreciation often, he would
not agree that “culture” has led back to a renewed apprehension
of pur© Christianity.
3# ”* • • we shall never rise above the ethical culture
^Quoted in Beye We Stand. Herman Sasse, (Bock Island, HI# i
Augsburg Publishing House, i9ho), p# 26, 27, from, conversations
with Beheman*
2

•'Reason” in the sense of being opposed by “revelation.”
Cf. Lather’s Doctrine of the two Heterogeneous Realms, p# 120.

4

of Christianity as it is reflected in the Gospels.** lather did
not feel that ethical culture was the basic concern of his own
quest, of Christianity, or of the Reformation.
4*

. *<as soon as the pure teaching and love of

Christ is apprehended and appropriated as it is,** Luther would
note that **aan will become aware of his greatness and freedom,** Man
does not apprehend the logos*by either reason or intuition? instead
he is apprehended by the logos in the form of agape of God.
for other reasons, each of the above concepts will be
dealt with in detail in later chapters. Hers they were selected
to bring out the difference in the nature of Luther8© quest from
,

a typical misconstruing of M s contribution as he would have
seen it,
Mrnt, then, is Luther*© relevancy to the philosophic
quest for individual liberty?
Luther8& quest was primarily a religious quest which asks
how a man can appear worthy or acceptable before a righteous God,
But the philosophical consequences of this religious experience
go beyond Luther and M s conception of the faithful, St leads to
a whole restructurization of society and the world which is the
source of modem individualism and human freedom in society, In the
present essay we shall limit ourselves to showing only the beginning
4

Logos » the plan of God.

2Aeaoe • the unearned love that God evidences to man.

5

of this transformation with Lather.
Luther carried out his quest within the framework ©f a
metaphysical monism and a religious dualism* Stated very
formally and briefly, this signifies that existence and essence
are one in Sod. that existence and essence are one in relation
ship to God, is true of all creation and true in a particularly
i
unique way for man, since man is Created in Hhe image of God.**
When God and man are united through the unearned, ^uncaused,n love
or aeape of God, existence and essence are one! man is at liberty
to live in relation to God (reality), and has recovered possession
of his essence in the world.
Since God has created all things, Lather affirms a
metaphysical monism, God existed before matter and created
matter jjx nihilo. Matter and all created things were necessarily
good, that is, in harmony with the Creator. But God has given the
possibility of evil, in that, man may choose to be apart from
Him, and creation may also be apart from Him, This opens the
possibility of a religious dualism, good and evil as oneness or
apartness from the Creator-God,
It might be argued, falsely, that much of modem, individu
alism has its origin in the Stoic view that so far as it dwells
in all men, divine reason is the ultimate foundation of all human
*This is a biblical presupposition which is not argued in
Scriptures.

6

dignity and justice. Man’s rationality, attributed to the general
divine reason,- allows him to be free from the world and grants
him dignity and individuality.
the significance of lather’s contribution was that all
human dignity derives not from a principle of rationality but the
personal will ©f a loving Creatoj>God which calls each individual
person into being. Individual personality is therefore determined
by the will of God just as is the general dignity of humanity.
Every human being has his own personal dignity residing in his
predestination* to personal being and is identical with the
dignity of every other human being. The Creator«God calls each
individual human being a wfhou®^ and summons him into fellowship.
Individuality is thus never inessential to- man’s nature, but is
a basic part of man’s being in the world. According to lather, by
denying relationship with the Creator-God,.man can forfeit his
dignity and true being* Man’s dignity than is not a fist set
down one© and for all, but a state of being which must be
achieved, lather makes possible this attainment in the world,
As luther understood it, in the acceptance of the I-Thou relationship
1
The presupposition of Christians is that man is partly
free and partly dot©mined. Hence, the element of free will
is not altogether missing in predestination.
2
la the sense of Marlin Buber that each individual is
capable of a response which reflects a personal freedom which
leads to respect for self and others.
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THE CONCEPT Op INDIVIDUAL LIBERTf H MB
CLASSICAL GREEK WORLD AND ITS CONCEPT
OP FATE, COSMOS AND HAS
Greek philosophy* like Greek tragedy and religion, shows
the attempt to rise above fate* The highest ideal of the human
life is found in the realm of thought, in rising above existence;
it is found neither in the realm of action nor in transforming
existence. The Greek struggle against fate is accomplished with
reason and knowledge which may restrict the power of fate. The
success of the Greeks to pit knowledge against fate and thereby
achieve a freedom for the individual laid some excellent groundwork
for the future* Nevertheless, it concluded its era with man still
encased not only in slavery to an ultimate destiny, but almost in
daily necessity*
A. Platonic Humanists and the individual considered in
the areas of s God and Creation} matter and spirit; Man
and his destiny; and Ethics.
1* God and Creation
Plato’s Demiurge shapes the world, but does not create it.

I

God does not create out of nothing.

to the Zeus of Plato, it is

a matter of indifference whether man recognizes him or not*
Unperturbed, he moires on his way in heaven without turning around
to see what Is happening either behind him or beneath him.

For

Plato tiie world had no beginning and could have no end. the
subject of whether the destiny of man, being inevitably bound up
with the fortunes of the universe, is in the survival of the soul
is debated in Phaedo. but no decision is reached*
Xenocrates, successor as head of the Academy, says
explicitly that Plato did not teach the creation of the world
"in time1' but instead was concerned alone with the study of its
phenomena in due and proper order.

3

The Platonic concept of God and creation can be illustrated
when it stands in contrast with the early Christian tradition.
The truth that God is the (hie who determines all things
and is determined by none, is the precise meaning of the idea of
creation as we find it in the early Christian tradition and in
Luther* Creation "out of nothing11does not imply, however— as
Gnosticism of all ages continually Interprets it— that there once
was a "Nothing" out of which God created the world, a negative
. Timaeus 53. B* 2*
2

Plato Phaedras.

^Virgilus Perm (ed«), The Mstorv of Philosophical
Systems (Paterson, N.J.! Littlefield Adams and Co., 1961), p. 102.

11

primal beginning, a Platonic ME ON, a fortaleasness, chaos or
primal darkness.*
The idea that there Is a *Nothing* alongside of God is
a part of all creation Myths, and w« can trace its influence on
the Old Testament story of creation.

Bat the Hour Testament

idsas of Graation absolutely exclude the idea of any other force
or substance save God in the Creation.

The significance of this

in the concept of man will be brought cut more fully later on.
For the Greek* the idea of creation

nihllo was unthinkable

and* in faot, impossible.

2,

Matter and Spirit

When a considerable time had passed, the world
ceased from its throes and confusion, and substituted calm
for agitation and went on its aoeustomcd course in an
orderly way* having the care and control of itself and
all that is in it. It remembered as far as it could the
teaching of the Father who made it. At first it
accomplished this pretty exactly* but
the end

gate
yjgaato
M Site
^ jaalsilil
gfrtfAS.tyC St tel mifmSt i*«*te in its nature from of
old* when it had a large element of irregularity
before assuming the order which it now has.
Plato holds that there is a sharply defined dualism

between two kinds of beings— the unseen and eternal to which the
soul belongs, and the visible and transient to which the body
belongs.

Body and soul enter into a temporary combination.

Compare Plato's ‘Mmsmiw 53 a-B with lather's inter
pretation of Gen. Ill, lather's Works, American Edition, I,6|
and John ltl-3 , A.I.,
6ff.

mi,

2ELat©

273 A-E*

The

body is the vehicle of the soul sad actually hinders the free
development of its powers*^ the material world which was
structured out of chaotic pre»existeni matter by -QOd is held

Z

together only by the Demiurge of Plate*

the dualism runs through

all creation, 2&» will escape from the earthly only- by keeping
his gaze constantly fixed m the transcendental eternal world*
'Shis wopM is a stepping stone to- the real world of ideas* She
world is a work of reason and a copy of the world of ideas*
i

■.'I*. Ian -and his Destiny
What then is the -role of f>m% Since -man has -a mind he is
not Just like other parts of the universe but in-cosmic piety
submits to the ruling principle of the worlds
4md one of these --portions of -the universe' is thine
own# unhappy man, which however little* contributes to the
wholes and you do not seem to- be aware that this -and
every other creation is for the- sake of the whole* and
in order that the life of'the mole may be biossods and
that you are created for the sake Of the whole* and- not
the whole for the sake of you,
4, fifchics
Ethics for flat# are subject to and determined by reason;
.Justice does not have a sense of equality of man. I&ther, each

* & & & * * ^*b *

2m m m
%

2021*203*

laws 901 8*13.

13

aan may fittingly serve in his niche of the ordered cosmos and
Plato indicates that an upward transmigration of the soul is the
reward of a rational life.* Plato, who discovered the Ideas as
a philosophical principle of explanation did not find it necessary
to deal with the problem of ngodsM and ttGod.tt fhe Ideas were
more divine than gods and reason sometimes corrected the gods.
It remained for Aristotle's prime mover to be the first philosophical
concept of a supreme god. ®ie essential humanism in Plato shows up
in his encouragement to man to ignore none of his natural faculties
but rather to develop them, temperance and rational harmony of the
2

parts will make the ideal man when reason is in control*

fhe next step in the concept of the individual comes
through Aristotle.
B. Aristotelian Humanism; Ethics; Creation and Cod;
and Man and Bis Destiny

3

*We must begin with things known to us.1*

Aristotle is

too good, a Greek not to believe that the highest kind of knowledge
is conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge must rest not on the
1Cf, Zeller, Outlines of the Mstpp: of
(Clevelandt Meridan Books, 1950)» p. 152.
2Cf. BembliolBl.
^lichomachean. Ethics 1095*

Greek

juggling of universals but on closely observed factual unity.
MIt is the nark of an educated nan to look for precision in each
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject permits.
Han must first of all find himself in his own development, not
in some abstract concept. “Clearly the virtue tie must study is
2
human virtue,“ the rational soul has various faculties, but not
as Pinto thought, parts, Kan*s functions from nutritive and
reproductive to rational thought are all a part of his organic
nature, and as a virtuous (i.e.* rational) organism he should
try to synthesise all the complex functions of his nature.
2, Creation and God
“What significance did the forms of ELato have on

3

sensibles if they neither cause movement nor any change in them?0
asked Aristotle, Shore must be a principle of motion whereby
sensibles are changed. Beality for Aristotle was in the
phenomena of particularity. Generalisations could proceed from
a given number of individual instances. From tie need for
motion to explain the aspect of change in nature, Aristotle
reasoned back to a First Cause, an unmoved Mover* this was a
tremendous jump in natural theology* the real danger, however,
was soon obvious, that the gods would soon lose their divinity*
1Ibid.* 109b*
%bid,4 1102*
^Metaphysics 980.

The world of Aristotle is there* as something
.has always been and always will be. It is an eternally
necessary and a necessari3y eternal world,, the- problem
for us is therefore not to know how It has oome Into feeing*
but to understand what happens in It and consequently what
it is. At the summit, of the Aristotelian universe is not an
Idea* but a self*subsisting and eternal. Act of thinking,
let us call it Thought* a divin© self~thinking Thought.
Below it are the concentric heavenly spheres* .each of 'which
is eternally moved fey a distinct Intelligence^ which
itself has a distinct god. from the eternal motion of ■these
spheres* the generation and corruption* that is* the
s* of all earthly things are eternally caused*'
God does not stand apart from his creation* but is
Captive Within the creation* Creation is a. necessity* not a
contingency* The sod of the human Individual is no longer m
immortal god like the Hattie soul, but is doomed to perish
with the body-* The god of Aristotle is not aware of man within
the creation. A truly ra1i,onal system is set up for man in
true humanist style* but it would seem that the individual man

Z

has lost- an immortal destiny.

3. Man and M s Destiny
Moral Virtue Involves the rational discipline ofpassion,
Both Plato and Aristotle feel that when man approaches God*s
level of thinking on thinking he will have reached the highest
capable state* even though Aristotle has the comment that such a
*ltlahne Gilson,
spd ^osgphy; (Hew Havens Yale
University Press* 19hl), p. 33.
aXbld*. p. 3h.

•••♦si

'S0 .

%

t

#

M

disclosed by Plato in the'fenabMo. where -this whole classof
people is' dealt with in a .low pages* the bulk of the ltegulfli.0
being concerned with the- class Of guardians. •■'Plato-sodas' to
•assume that this lows? substratum of sOeiaty will achieve its'
own natural balance and justice,

the concern for man as mm

to become a problem', only in the ^formation and afterwards.

seems

1 ;

Aristotle, the Greek gods seem to have renounced, once and for
*'V

all, their former care and concern for man* To open the hooks
Of the great 3toa.es is to find in almost every chapter a mention
■Of 'God, hat' it is a god of fire, 'an feeamrable Ged*foree, a
/material, elementout of which the worldis made, that, directs the
universe, ’'Flums ..and changes,perpetually renew the world, Just
as .the mbroken ..inarch,.of time, makes ever new the infinity of the
.#§©%"*• |n.,snch,a'nhiverse,. an.abstraction pick as..Hste*s- cemeept
of,,justice m s snthinkabl© and knowledge could rely .upon nothing
hut the data of sensation*. (**I3v©ry duty," .says Ifercns Aurelius

S i 2&f* "is the sum of separate duties.'*) fee individual then
finds his only recourse to withdraw from the world to. which
Aristotle had tried to adjust man. he most subordinate himself
to the natural course of events, for the grumble at anything that
happens, is a rebellion against nature, in some part of which are
bound Up the natures of all other things. For the '’nature of
understanding is to assent to the true, dissent from the false,
and remain aloof f«>m the uncertain."2
fh© Greeks have tried to explain the world and man by
means Of several conceptual principles which/they came to regard
as things* fee dignity of man at this point comes from the submission
to a thing, it marks the last words of Greek- wisdom?
1

®&rcus Aurelius vi*15.
2

w
Mhat men cannot possibly bring themselves to do
is to worship a thing. When Greek philosophy came to
an end* what was sorely needed for progress In natural
theology was progress in metaphysics. Sueh progress
was to be made as ear3y~ae-the fourth century A.S.;
but curiously enough# metaphysics was to make it under
the influence of religion*^

\

the sage*, who is the ideal1man* cannot surrender himself to
!
pity nor to any emotional involvement with other individuals, The
'

1

*

impossible elevation of the sage has been a problem to human common
I
sense and to benevolence of the Christian concern.
i
A great influence of Stoicism was its contribution to the
development of individualism through the Soman law* the equality
Of man based on each .man*0 significance .in the cosmic order, was
insisted on by %iotetus the slave and Marcus Aurelius the emperor.
*'Slave yourself* wiH you not bear with your own brother* who has
Zeus for his progenitor* and is like a son from the same seeds and
of the same descent from above?*' asks Epictetus*

O

The Soman Stoics

were overwhelmed by the grandeur of the concept of universal reason
grasped rationally by men and working out a Justice for all* Thus
there would be a basic equality for all. She concept of the Greek
eity*states was extended to an equalitarian Jurisprudence for all
men. Zeno himself* according to Plutarch* had argued that (*We
should not live in cities and demes* each distinguished by separate
rules of Justice* but should regard all men as fellow-demesmen and
..

\

;' ".
i.............
^Gilson, pp. cit.. p. 37. l
^Discourses 1*13.

.....

19
felilot^citisensi and there should be one life and order as of a
single flock, feeding together in & coman pasture.**
there is a sturdy respect for the individual mm in this concept
vddeh became the basis for Homan .law, but as we will indicate later
it had a .completely different ontological basis than did the <JudeoChristian individuality*^ M the later Stoics, there was a crossing
and blending with Christian elements. For that reason it is important
to review the differing ontological assumptions. The ethics of later
stoicism seem so near to the Christian ethics that by later tradition
Seneca is declared to be a Christian and Augustine holds up the life
of the heathen emperor Marcus Aurelius as an example for Christians,
tot, Marcus Aurelius persecutes the Christians, and Christianity
declares war to death on the Stoa. This is significant for it has
the same basis in part as the much later conflict in the Renaissance
and Reformation period— i.e., with the same conflict and ontological
difference.
In summary, in Greek JhiXosopby the individual finds his
existence in relation to the Wbrld«.Soul* Out of the left-over
.materials, the demiurge formed souls equal in number to the stars*
The souls have been incorporated into mortal bodies and shall be
released from the turmoils of matter when tested and purified to
then, rise and be reunited with the t&rM-Sool*. What freedom there
is, is to, be achieved in being released frpm the world of matter#
•^Cicero £§> £§ Publics I#32#
^Infra. chap.* 11, p. 21*
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A, World View Concepts
The differing ontological basis for the concept of the
world and the individual of the Greek and Christian heritage can
be noted by first going back to the Before*? concept of the world
and then moving to the Christian concept# 3h fact* it Is
necessary to do this to clarify the difference in outlook for
later Stoics had already been influenced by the Christian
tradition and later Christians showed marked influence from the
Greek tradition* Philo of Alexandria had already been 'working on
a reconciliation of Hellenic and Hebrew thought by the beginning
of the Christian era* The beginning Of the Christian era marks
the turning point from the Greek concept of the individual as a
part of the structure of a created world to the individual being
in relationship to the Creator of a world*
1# Old Testament Concept
In the Hebrew concept, God stands wabovett the world,
because He is the lord, because it is only through His Word that
it exists at all* This is not a spatial concept because God alone

creates Space. In Hebrew ontology, “before** and “above** are both
predicates of His Being as lord. Ibis is in direct opposition to
the view of the Greek philosophy aid its later exponents, namely,
that there is a correlation between God and the world, $ost as
there is between left and right. That is, that the one cannot be
conceived apart from the other. She Hebrew concept is of a God
who is “there,“ apart from the world, who Himself posits the
world. She world is not hi© alter ego, and when we think of the
world we must consider it not as something which essentially
belongs to God in the sense of naturally or eternally, but as
something which only exists because it was created by God, If it
were otherwise, God would not be lord of the world at all, but
would rather, in a sense, be its double,.
God then, as He is in Himself is the reason that there is
a world at all. According to Judee-Christlar thought, God’s “as he
is in Himself** is also at the same time M s will to communicate
Himself, His being for us before we come into being, ft is be
cause He is “for us** that we have been created and it is because
He wills to communicate Himself that .the world exists. Thu© we
■speak .not only of -an eternal Being of God, but also of an eternal
Mil, which preceded all created being as the ground of Its
existence*^
The biblical world -viewpoint is that man of himself, cannot
^This is the theme which we will find later-in lather*

23

/
understand or even apprehend this ^decree of creation.® It is the
divine self-revelation that makes it available to man.
2* Hew Testament View
The Hew Testament continues with the Hebrew thought when it
says of God*s plan that it contains? ,fWhat no eye has seen, nor
ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared
for those who love him.®^
It is no accident that in the Biblical accounts, Creation
and Salvation are mentioned in one breath, The same record of
revelation which speaks of the divine plan of Salvation speaks of
the plan or decree of Creation! for how could God*s purpose for the
world not be Sis plan which precedes it?2 The lord of the world
does not reveal his sovereignty without indicating that the world
is grounded in His will, and that not only the fact of the
•5

existence of the world, but all that included in the fact of
creation, manner, and purpose, is based on His Will which precedes
and establishes it.2
laftien the words ^Creator® and ®CreationM and ®creature® are
used by Christian thinkers, they mean what the creeds ■ say in spite
of the fact that there are non-Christian or philosophical statements
which sound very similar. When the Creeds speak of the Creator, it
*X Cor, 2:9 R.S.V.; Cf. Isa. 6 k M 65.17*.
2Cf, John 1:1-3! Col, !?15,16! I Cor* 8s6*
3Eph, 1*11.
**Apostle, Hlcene and Athansian Creeds*

ik
means the God of historical revelation, the Father of Jesus Christ,
the fritsno God, who is revealed in the divine decree of Creation, ■/
We mentioned before that in almost all religions there are
cr©ation**K$rths of all kinds! there is a Creator*Spirit •which
stands behind and above .the gods, The doctrine of •'creation* in
Plato*s Ihmaeu^ (of* 29ft»30C) easily lent itself to Christian
interpretation as do the writings of the great Stoicsi Epictetus,
Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, the Sew testament would
''

*

suggest that these ideas exist because God does not only reveal
Himself through His Word in History, but also through H U work in
Creation, thus He leaves no man without a witnessBut those
ideas suggest a different knowledge of God the Creator from that
which is seen in. historical revelation because sinful man is not
capable of grasping what God shows him in His work in Creation
without turning it into something else,^
3, New Testament %dstemology
If God reveals Himself fully in the Incarnate Word, Jesus
Christ, then
first chanter of the Gosnel of John, and some other passages in
the New Testament, a&lj with the first chapters of Genesis# this
is the normal rule for Christian theologians as to all other areas
of Biblical concepts though a number of them get led astray in
considering the creation concept.
1Acts ihtl7* Bom# 1*19#
%om. 1:21.

Creation* then* in the Near Testament* is not a theory of
the way in which the world came into existence. The belief in
Creation arises at the point where all Christian faith arises*
namely* in the revelation* of Cod in Jesus Christ. The 2-fhou
experience of truth-ao-sneounter with Jesus Christ as Lord
absolutely* “above” and “before” all implied “1, thy; lord* the
Creator,” The idea of Creation in the Jndeo-Christian tradition
means that the individual together with all of Hatere to which
the individual belongs is absolutely dependent on God* while He*
on the other hand* is dependent neither upon the individual nor
upon nature*
Purtherwore* Creation is the work of Bivine Omnipotence
and the work also of His Holy love# God creates the world in
Absolute Freedom, but fils Freedom is identical with. His lovo*^
%

Greek and Judeo-Christian Confrontation

Greek philosophy has a logos which makes the world a
cosmos.- But this idea of Logos-Cosmos is con^pletely different
from that of the logos of Creation*. In Greek thought, God and. the
World, stand as correlative expressions 'of each other* In- Greek
thought, the world has already reaehed its goal.3 The JudeoChristian idea means that the purpose of the world is in God* that
^The radical historical self-disclosure of God to man.
2

.

A biblical presupposition*

% * Plato's Resitblic* 38OD-38IC and Timaeus 92C.

Be wills to bring man to 'relat»ioasMp with Himself9 m i thus the

m $id m i history has a purpose and meaning,
Gilson put#- it this ways
*
what Mat# had said was almost exactly -what the
ihidstim$. themselves were saying* ’saving only the
difference of. the ■article* for Moses- said? ’|!e who
4#§* m d 3 M o * ilhat Which let* And it is quite
true that ^either'of the expressions m @ m to apply
to the existenee of God-.‘r If God i# *Ie who is,* he
also is ’that which iss’ because, to-ho somebody is
also to hh something; let the- converse is pot true*
for to he somebody m much more than ■#©■-.he something*
WO m e here at thedlvidimg line between Greek

'-mat Is tosayW'"’helween'
Greek philosophy and Christian philosophy. 'taken in
itself, Christianity ms m % a philosophy, ft m s
essentially the religions doctrine tf the salvation of
mm- through Christ, '^ristlm philosophy arose at
the Juncture of Greek fhliosopty and of the Jewish*
Christian religious revelation, Greek philosophy pro*
viding the technique for a rational aimlanation of' the
world, and the Jei4sh*Christian revelation providing
religious beliefs of incalculable philosophical import.*
A# long a# thi Jewish. Sod was exclusively the property of
the Jsiftsfe people they could

use their own thought^forms, When

through the .impact of the Gospel the God of the 4m$ was no
longer the

private God @f an elect race and became .increasingly

promulgated as ■the universal God of aji

new thought forms

had,.M..he.fmnd, Any Christian convert who understood the Greek
thought*forms was bound to sense that his philosophical principle

had- to be on#, with hia religious .first principle. At this point,,
%!i:S©a,. gg. clt«,pn,

'1

^

% a the book of Jonah God had already been considered as
being God of non-Israelites bat m major attempt was made to win

2?

eo far as the world itself is concerned, an entirely new phlloPJgak^ga &£

£Sgg&£&« 2he Christian revelation was

establishing existenc© at the deepest layer ofreality as well as the
supreme attribute of divinity* It could no longer be, a question of .
fflhat is nature? bait rather What is being? to explain the content of
ISSS32S2B1,

the second century A.D* on, men hay© had to use the Greek

philosophical technique to express ideas that were not in the thinking
of any Greek philosopher* fhe task was by no means ea*y»
the difference in character between the Apostles* Greed, Which
is basically an affirmation of belief, and the Moen© Greed Which
enters into the midst of ih© Arlan controversy to discuss the nature
of Christ in such terms as ousj^ and homoouslon.? shows the radical
change that had taken place. The us© of the same words and in some
cases the same thought-fonas brought the open and later realised
possibility of supposing that because both Greek and Christian used
the same words, the same ,meaning was ia&lied*
5* Ontological Mffermee
Hie different ontological orientation of the Stoics and the
Christians referred to* can now be shorn.
*Tho proclamation of the solf-revdation of God*
%&sla - same substance
^loaoougiop » Hko substance
^JSanm* chap. i, pp. 18ff.,

m
the Greek $tai# n# egUnted to m Mea, the rafeMnallty of
the universe* the mtm. m u to the W©rM*State* the m m M r n to
the Qsmipa>tm%t loving, Greaton.
It should foe noted that the popular pMlesophera of Stoicism*

m m widely need wMiera m %ictetus, m & m * Seneca, and timm
Mrelias, who actually p^pouaded the idea, of the essential equality
.and.natty of men with fervor and clarity had a direct influence on the
1mm

of -iewan law. lot the

of

and

%pall%* .to quite different from the C&Mshian mmept*
Hue ChMsbian concept of Justice stems from the ftimage*of*GodM
which to man’s foaMe dtgMiy and worth. Because God. has received nan
tote i^senat taieroeurse with itoself* 8»

gtvo m m the eoswMsMoa

i
to rule mm creation with divine authority. The ruling position of
m m does not depend on the technical control over nature of which ho
is. capable nor M s dependence on being a. Wpas#* of the general
creation. God gives to man, Mthwhom Be-has established this personal
relationship, « share of M s own dominion over the werM.

Because God-

hoc mad© mm- & * own companion, it it a sin against God, a blood&
guiltiness, a crimen M e s ^ mieetatisf if the life of a man, is
foamed. Soever sheds the- blood- of man, by man shall M s blood be
dted! for God. made man in- M s own iraage.^
iBuara. p. Eh.
2High treason*
%en* 9?6.
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As differing from the Stoic notion of equality, the
Christian view is not based on an impersonal, spiritual principle
— i.e. on a nous or logos pervading all things, a world of
reason in which all human beings substantially participate. It is
based instead on the personal will of God. The Christian principle
of dignity of the person is unconditionally personal; the personal
God creates the personal and individual human being and predestines
him to communion with Himself. Thus the origin of human dignity
shared equally by all mankind is not to be sought in abstract
reason, nor in a general order of being, but in the will of the
living God, who addresses each man as wthouH and calls ,him to
responsible being, to a living relationship, in the love (agape)
with which He first loved man. The individual*s right as a person
is not founded on the fact of his humanity as derived from uni*
versal reason; every single person is called to a supreme destiny
as a human being, that concrete and unique individual.*
Individual personality is thus determined by the will of
God just as much as the general dignity of humanity. Since it is
the divine agape which calls him Into personal relationship, that
which makes man man is not different from individuality, but is one
and the same thing. Thiia lndivlduallty-for-the-Chrlstian-ls-neverinessential. but is just as integral a part of man’s being as that
which is common to all men. God does not love mankind in general
but as individuals in His own nature, created by Himself*
*Gf. Ps. 139*16; Isa. 43*1.
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The secret of the Christian concept of Justice is thus not
an equality but the blend of ecmaHtv and inequality: the blend
having the same origin as the idea of equality, Thus a totally
different evaluation of inequality results, God does not create
concepts but individuals, There is a sense of inequality inherent
in individuality as each man is a wThouB before God. The
inequality springs from the same root and has the same dignity as
equality.
In the earliest Biblical story of creation,* the story
begins Tilth the creation of man and ends Tilth the creation of
woman, In the later story {Genesis 1:2?), the most cardinal in
equality of man and -woman is mentioned in the same sentence as
the creation in the image of God,^
In Stoicism the difference of sox is like all individuality
— inessential or even insignificant. In the Christian concept,
it is given ultimate dignity, i.e., the dignity of creation*
Where the dignity of man is attributed to general divine
reason instead of God-created personality, as is the case with the
Stoics, communion cannot be the goal of existence, but only union,
the return of the spark of divine reason to the flaming sea of the
-aH-pervading-reason-o£-Godi— In-the-same-wayr-tho-souls-trans**---ported to the air remain there a while, are then transformed,
*Gen. 2thb.
2See Infra, p. 3&* line 9ff, for responsibility.
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in the recurrent cycle Troy would fall again,1 wGnce and for all
Christ died unto sin,M2
C, The Metamorphosis of the Christian Kerygma
While the ontological basis for understanding being was
thus far apart, nevertheless the content of the Christian kerygma
was explained in Greek terms, and this will be later demonstrated,
in some cases with Greek rather than Hew Testament epistemology*
The affirmations of the Christian kerygma were met with
denial by some and skepticism by others, The task of Christian
apologetics was forced upon the church from two directions, both
from the desire to communicate the kerygma and the need to defend
its own position against the Greek view. And in addition, there
ware those such as Augustine, who upon reading Plotinus* felt that
there were two things to be learned from the Greeks,
As we have indicated already,3 one of the features of the
Greek culture was its outstanding concern, willingness, and
ability to generalise and form abstract ideas* Their elaboration
of one class of ideas such as form and quantity led to the forma
tion of the early sciences* Probably the earliest and most
typical of these is Geometry, The forms were regarded as having_
■^Poland iBainton, Barlar and Medieval Christianity (Boston*
Beacon Press, 1962), p* 8. Cf. also Aristotle’s Physics Bk VXH,
Chap* 8* 264b ff,
%om. 6*10; cf, also Heb* 9*12 and 10*12.
PP« I3ff*
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i. Augustine and Plotinus
When Augustine# already a convert to Christianity# began
to read the works of 'some of the Neo-Platonists, particularly
the Phneads of Plotinus, he found an original synthesis of Plato,
Aristotle, and the Stoics#* Plotinus had identified the Idea of
the Good# as described in the Republic. with that other puzzling
principle, the One# which makes its late appearance in Flato*s
Parmenides (135*136)# Prom the One, a second principle is born#
inferior to the first and yet eternally subsisting like the One.
Its name is Intellect# which Plotinus calls Hous and considers
it to be the source of Plato’s ideas.^ 3h the Christian God of
Augustine# there is on the one side Godj one in tho 'Trinity of a
single self-codsting substance! on the other side# there is all
that which because it has but a received existence is not God.
In Plotinus the Nous# as differing from the eternal Word of the
Gospel of John, is of a lower order than the One. The soul, next
linked to the Kona is a corporeal bridging of the abyss between
Form and the world of sense. All creation is a hierarchy of
emanations, each giving origin to the next, that which lies out
side of the radius of such emanation is unshaped matter# negative#
laeaningleQs# and bad because it is merely-1’not.**3 Prom this
point# Plotinus develops an ethics which abhors the sensate and
*Cf. Windelband, I, History of Philosophy, p. 235ff.
^Cf. Gilson, 0£. clt.. p. 4*»f.
3&meads iii 6.7#
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exalts the spirit. The closer the individual approaches pare
spirituality, the wore virtuous he Is.*
When Plotinus and the Gospel of John met in the mind of
Augustine, he attempted to put the combination together, but he
found difficulties in working it out. The God of Augustine is the
true Christian God, apart fron, but creating ex nlhllo. the world.
When, however, he tries to explain the world, he does so in Greek
terms of concept and Homan Stoic terms of State. Matter is
degraded and the spirit is elevated,^ Having picked up the
Platonic world, Augustine finds himself having picked up Platonic
man, and though he works to keep the Hebrew concept of body-soul
as ono and does conclude with this thought, there are difficulties.
The witness of Augustine himself in the seventh book of Confes
sions',shows the bond between Neo-Platonism and himself*^ Other
Greek concepts were adopted also.
She Roman Stoic concept of the State became a model for
the hierarchical construction and administration of the Church,
The loss of individuality by immersion into the Church, as not
only the invisible but visible Body of Christ was significant.
The individual was subjected now now to the conceptual Ideas or
Ideal-State, but to the""ABbolute visible Church.
This was a different relationship from the Jewish concept
*£hneads iv 8.2.
2Infra* p. h5,
3jhfra, Chap. ill.

V
of the relationship of the individual to the absolute*
2* Development of Creeds and Canon
<t

the words which designate belief or faith from the Old.
testament are words which carry the sense of ferpat in a .person*
they espress confidence in personal goodness, veracity and up
rightness* they are as moral as they are intellectual* Their
use in application to God was net different from their use in
application to men* Abraham trusted God* The Israelites trusted
God when they saw the Egyptians dead on the seashore* The
analysis of belief led to the construction of other propositions
about God* God is wise, good, just, then belief in God came to
mean agreement with certain propositions about God*
Philo, blending the Old Testament concept with the Greek
words of intellectual conviction rather than moral trust* says
that to believe in God Is to trust also His prophets— that is, to
i
confide in what is recorded In the Holy Scriptures*
from the conviction that God being of a certain nature
has certain attributes* we find a basis for the Creeds.^ From
the conviction that God being true, the statements which He makes
through M s prophets as true, we get the Canon of the Hew______
Testament#

(“For whoever would draw near to God must believe

that he exists and that he rewards those who seek Mm.w
% * Philo’s de Abraham 11*39.
Apostles, Nieene and Athansian Creeds.
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Hebrews 11s6; and °He wise is of God hears the Words of God»w

John 8ity?4}
3*- Summary of Chapters I and 32
the -Creeds and the Canon became authoritative when there
was apostolic consensus through a tribunal. This means that the
concept of %eMef1
* has now left philosophy as it formerly left
theology and entered into the field of polities. The change of
the Christian Kerygma and the resulting lose of the unique JudeoChristian individuality can be Shorn quite simply. The individual
dignity of man began by being!

(1) a simple trust in God; then

(2) a simple easpansion of that trust into m assent to the propo
sition that God is good; (3) a simple acceptance of the proposition
that Jesus Christ m s His Goni (h) the definition of terras., and
each definition of terms involved a new theory; and finally,
(5) the theories were gathered together into systems, and the
martyrs and witnesses of Christ died for their faith, not outside
but inside the Christian sphere; and instead of a world of
religious belief, which might resemble the world of actual fact in
the sublime equality before God while inequal in creation,1
there prevailed the fatal assumption that the symmetry of a system
is the test of its truth and a proof of it. &gaaa$a& tern
liberty was losing a.battle to what would, soon become & structured
hierarchical system. It was a short step from required conformity
pp. 29ff.

$£ conduct which found fruition in the monastic system.
Agreement .In opinion* which had been the basis of union
.in the Greek philosophical schools* now came to form a new
element in the bond .of union within and between tee churches.
It was.In this setting that(.iugustine attempted to
systematise .an# yet still retain the concept of individual
human liberty, fpat he had .difficulties, is not surprising*
ISore amazing is the tremendous scope of M s interests and the
appearance of synthesis test Was .Achieved*

c h a p t e r -h i

THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS ARRIVED
AT IN AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS
To approach, the Medieval view of man, the next step in
our historical concept of human freedom, it is necessary to make
peace with Augustine’s thought* it would be absurdly over
simplifying things to say that Augustine’s view of man is itself
the Medieval view, let there is some truth in the statement*
for all Medieval concepts of the individual use Augustine for a
point of reference* if not for agreement* And the concepts
around which the Medieval Church constructed its dogma and its
institutions were those which Augustine defended. He is one of
those three or four figures of the last twenty centuries who
seems to be a hinge between epochs. 2h Augustine’s case, one
book out of his great literary production is significant in die*
playing his concepts, specifically, The City o£ God. It was
written as a rebuttal to these who blamed the Christians for the
-faH-of-Romsr-(4iO“A7D7)"beeause ef~the abolition of pagan
worship. Its chief theme is the relation of the Church to the
world.
Augustine’s thinking was influenced by the traditions of
Latin oratory and his theology by Neo-Platonism. Mere than a

link between paganism and Christianity, he dominated the concepts
of God and man for the next six centuries, for his position was
not really challenged juntil the time of Aquinas.
t

Augustine*s view
of the individual is conditioned by his
• {
view of God. He saysY
t
The true God, from whom,is aid being, beauty,
for® and number, weight and measure; He from Whom
all nature, mean and excellent, all seeds of forms,
all forms of seeds, all notions both of forms and
seeds, derive and have being * , . it is in no way
credible that He would, leave the kingdoms of raon
and their bondages and freedoms loose and uncomprised
in the laws of Ids eternal providence.*
Within a century after his death the Athanaslan Creed was
adopted as the statement of the Church# Its statement is based on
the omnipotence of God and the depravity of man. From it, we
obtain a View of the Medieval minds

—

1. Whoever will be saved! before all things it is
necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith*
2* Which Faith except every one do keep whole and
undefiled; without doubt he shall perish ever
lastingly*
3, And the Catholic Faith is this* That we worship
one God in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity;
29. Furthermore it Is necessary to everlasting
salvation; that he also believe rightly the
3ncarnation of our lord Jesus Christ.
32. Perfect God; and perfect Hah, of a reasonable
soul and human flesh subsisting*
3*K Who although he be God and Han; yet he is not_______
taorbut one~Christ;
3?. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one
man* so God and Man is one Christ;
38* Who suffered for our salvation; descended into
heH* rose again the third day from the dead*
*g£ Civltate Dei, in the translation by J. Healy, V, 1*

kz

41* At whose coating all men shall rise again with
their bodies;
42. And shall give account for their own works*
43» And they that have done good shall go into
life everlasting; and they that have done
evil* into everlasting fire*
44. This is the Catholic Faiths Which except a man
believe faithfully, he can not be saved.1
Explicit in the creed is that which is illicit in Augustine's
philosophy*
(1) A highly systematized and structured concept of the
world with rational overtones, and (2) the mysteries of a God who
cannot be approached rationally in the Trinity, Incarnation, and
Resurrection.
A* God and Creation
The two fundamental views from Augustine which were the
basis for Medieval thought were* the Omnipotence of God and the
weakness of man*
Upon the first he built a theocentric universe in which
everything was dependent upon Godfs Will for its existence, la
contrast with the Greek view which regarded history as a series
of cycles, endlessly repeating itself, Augustine, in accordance
with the Biblical view, maintained that it had a beginning and a
(nilMMtioiu As Augustine saw it, from its very beginning all
history has been directed and governed by God and moves to a
«

climax in a society in which God1a Will is to be perfectly
Ipbillip Schaff, The Greeds of Christendom, as quoted in
George Forell, J&a Protestant Faith ( Saglewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, I960), pp. 254-255*

43

accomplished. Augustine held that in the beginning angels and
men were created rational and free; furthermore* there was no
evil anywhere— quite in keeping with his Heo-Flatonlc background.
When Plato speaks of creation* he conceives of a prlml~
tlve matter to which the Dszaiurge gives form. God is craftsman
rather than Creator* The primitive matter is Hotemalw and
uncreated, the Demiurges being responsible for the world only as
efficient cause* In contrast to this, Augustine holds that the
world was created ey-nlhilo. God creates not only the order and
arrangement, but also the primitive matter* God must therefore
be responsible for all that Is* and if God is “good** and *one,**
the basis for a monistic view is established.
B* Dualism
fha Greeks had argued the problem of evil in terms of
permanence and change* fetter, which is unstable, is evil* and
reason, which enjoys permanence, is good. in contrast, the City
of Goifl Is the illustration par excellence of God*s good and
abiding will. It Is a picture of God working out His will in a
linear history. Evil is permitted by God for the sake of a
larger good. Flotlnus-i;rotxld-Jsav.--efgll-ls-of-no consequence — -because it has no metaphysical existence; ’’For in matter we have
destitution— of sense, of virtue, of beauty, of pattern, of
Ideal principle, of quality* this is surely ugliness, utter

Ilk

disgracefulness, unredeemed evil*"*
According to Augustine, Ada® creates evil when he fails
to make, a better choice in Bden, and this evil then becomes a
thing of permanence, Evil therefore is not Of God’s creation,
for that would be unthinkable. Bather it is of man’s perverted
will* Evil thus becomes the object of God’s grace, ’
Where God
is, evil is not. Where God is not, evil is, God cannot be held
2
'
responsible for evil’s origin. Thai which really exists must
exist in relation to the center of existence, namely God. God
and ,fbeing,tt true wbeing* can be almost interchanged. There is
then no actual, but only a seeming, dualism.
All which is corrupted is deprived of good. But
if they be deprived of all good, they will cease to
be. For if they be, and cannot be at all corrupted,
they will become better, because they shall remain
incorruptibe. And what more monstrous than to assert
that those things which have lost a H their goodness
are made better? Therefore, if they shall be de
prived of all good they shall no longer be. So
long, therefore, as they are, they are good? there*
fore whatsoever is, is good. That evil, then, which
I sought whence it was, is not any substance? for
were it a substance, it would be good. For either it
would be an incorruptible substance, which unless it
were good it could not be corrupted, 1 perceived,
therefore, and it was made clear to me, that Thous
didst make all things good, nor is there any
substance at all that was not made by Thee? and
because all that Thou hast made_are^not^eaual.-there*—
fore all things are? because individually they are
good, and altogether Very good, because our God made
all things very good.3
lEnneads ii h,l6.
^Augustine does not deal with this as a causal situation.
3confessions vii 11.18.

C, Man and His Sestiny
The falling away of man from bis God-given status of
possessing initially a perfectly free-will and holy inclination
results in his becoming a lower-level beings unable by any means
to raise himself to his former status* He now has an inheritance
of corruption and shares this tilth nature as well*
It is certainly significant that in the pity of God there
is a basic concern hot only for God’s dealings with man, but for
What happens to man. This in Itself was a major contribution to
the history of Western Thought. Man* since Mam’s fall, has no
freedom to do good? he only has the permissive freedom to do evil.
He has permissive freedom in relation to the good# but he cannot
accomplish any good. Man# since Mara’s fall# still rightly be
longs to God# and finds no rest until he finds rest in God. But
because of his sinful condition, he is unable to achieve union
with God by himself* He is unable to accomplish the true ful
fillment of his nature. He is slave to a depraved Mil— a
defiant will. In this sense* he has lost his right to please
God# for he has lost his God-given freedom since he misused it.
i

*

Eaoh soul is a unique spiritual entity and a thinking
being. But man cannot by his rationality approach God.* Man
(similar to the Neo-Platonic principle of illumination) finds God
through mystic means, A H men are perverted of will and deserve
iCf.# p. U6*

06
to be left to their own misery* God will call some (the elect)
to full realization of themselves and they will be "saved***i.e., spared this damnation. God has predetermined the number
who will be saved, and eventually they will not be able to sin.
,Ihe culminating blessing is one exceeding that of Adaa^-i.e., to
not be able to forsake the good or to die* This, according to
Augustine, was the highest freedom of all.
A number of these views were sharpened in controversy
with the Pelagians, who felt that each man at birth has the
ability to choose the good.
D. Ethics
Augustine,e idea of the City of God was in effect a
Medieval papacy without the name of Borne, although it was Roman.
VJhile it is not completely clear that Augustine equated the
visible Church with the reign and rule of God, it was similar
enough for the Medieval authorities to assume this. !Ehe Church
is not the transcendent Heavenly City in any full sense, but it
represents that city before men. Augustine wanted secular power
used against the Bonattst heretics, not because the state had
the right to ecclesiastical concerns,but because the Church had.
the right to use earthly power to its ends. Augustine was Roman
in this sense, for he was both official of the Empire and priest
of the Church. It is apparent that in such a view the idea or
function of an autonomous state is severely limited.
Ethics and the development of self were related to the

4?

Church because the Church alone had the sacraments which were the
mediating instruments of God*s will* Through the Church also came
the institutionalized egression of man’s reaction to his worth
lessness*
While the body was not irrevocably evil to Augustine* yet
It was the means through which he had fallen* He had fallen from
his pristine state from misuse of will stressed through bodily
appetite. The carnal nature of man was distrusted by Augustine
and typically with the mystery religions and Heo-KLatonism in
flight from the world, man’s body end bodily needs were viewed
with abhorrence. The institutionalized asceticism or menastieiem
thus became one of the better means of self-development.
The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience in effect
denied three of man’s main obligations ** (i) to his physical
welfare, <2> to his family, and (3) to his political group* As a
repudiation of all secular and social responsibilities, monastieism was to be the Church’s answer to the humanism of Greece,
Augustine’s radical departure from the humanistic tradition
is apparent in his substitution of will for reason. For God and
man, will, not knowledge, became the key to the dominant forces of
-the-universe.-and-aoye^ignty-of-the-idll^mpnlaacts-ia^^SliRence*:—
He rejects the apathy of the Stoics and sayst “in our
ethics we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry as

m
•Off he is angry.*1 He recognises the fact that Christ was properly
angry when He drove the traders out at the temple, and concludes that if
the will is proper, the passions “will be not merely blameless, but m m
praiseworthy,«

Mam*s sin was not on© of judgment but of error of the

will., His evil was %3ot a substance, but a perversion of the will, bent
aside from fhee, 0 God, the Supreme Substance, towards these lower things,
and casting out its bowels, and strolling outwardly*Here Augustine ties
broken sharply from Greece where virtue is a form of knowledge and the
universe is essentially rational* the superrationcl evidence of God’s
inscrutable will and man’s chief claim to fulfillment is to bow to this
sovereign will, according to Augustine, a benevolent will, even in
damning determinism*^
3h spite of all the latent individualism which might be
©Kpected from his epistomological approach because of his In*
sistence on an intuitive and superrational apprehension of God,
the Church and the State became coercive institutions which
lin&ted individualism* Salvation became a matter of doctrine
instead of personal Intuition, the individual was, in effect,
asked to submit his faith to the Church and institutionalised
______ *gfea City of God i%» 5

*

_____

2Ibid.« siv* 6.

^Cf, Vorgilius Fern (ed.), History
Htilosophical Systems
(Paterson,
Uttlefield & Mams, 1961)7
Windelband, Jk j&gfcggy of Philosophy (Hew fork* Harper and Jftoe forch*
book 38), I, 28Af.j tjhere he points out Augustine’s Predestination
as a concept involving basic blessedness.
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faith resulted in institutionalised ethics with its resultant
loss of individualism. The Medieval Church* basing its premise
on the fact that it would do for man what he could not do for
himself, strengthened its hold on the individual under the elaim
of uniquely mediating man’s relationship to God,
Augustine held that the visible Catholic Church is the
body of Christ, even though it is impure. In his reply to the
Donatists, who were thoroughly “orthodox** in doctrine and
organisation, and yet rejected the Catholic Church as impure
(because it allowed the sacraments to be administered by men who
may have been guilty of “deadly** sins), Augustine saids'
Those are wanting In God’s love who do not care
for the unity of the Church; and consequently we
are right in understanding that the Holy Spirit may
be said not to be received except in the Catholic
Church . , , whatever, therefore, may be received
by heretics and schismatics, the charity which
covereth the multitude of sins is the special gift
of Catholic unity,1
Authority becomes the norm of faith* Sacraments are the work of
God, not of men. They do not depend upon the character of the
administrator* Those outside the Catholic Church need not to be
rebaptised on entering it, but it is only in the Catholic Church
that the sacraments attain their appropriate fruition, for there
alone can be found that love to which they witness, and in which
constitutes the essence of the Christian life,
Furtliermore, the sacraments are necessary for salvation.
^Bfeptjsm lii,l6.2i.
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ttThe churches of Christ maintain it to be an inherent principle,
that without baptism and partaking of the Supper of the Lord it
is impossible for any man to attain either to the kingdom of Cod
or to salvation and everlasting life.5**
It is evident that there are many profound contradictions
in Augustine’s system. He taught a predestination in which God
sends grace to whomever He will, yet He confined salvation to the
visiblo Church endowed with a sacramental ecclesiastic!sm. He
approached the distinction made at the Reformation between the
visiblo and the invisible Church without clearly reaching it. He
saw the Christian life as one of personal relation to God in
faith and love,, yet he taught no less positively a legalistic
and monastic asceticism. He was the father of the tremendous
structure of the Medieval Church which suppressed individuality,
and a pious individualist from whom later reformers could draw
inspiration. **Therefore the church even now is the kingdom of
Christ and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His
saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign
hereafter; and yet though the tares grow in the church along with
the wheat, they do not reign with

^Forgiveness of Sins, i.3
^Clty of God, zx.9
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If, as Augustine indicated, mil was more important then
reason, if God possessed all will, and 'if- the only thing of vain©
was the Asoul,4* then, not only all things material wor© suspect,
bat reason also, fh© individual was submerged, and by predestination in a flatonic sense, only the universal was significant, and
not the individual, gvm though the Middle Ages knew no Greek, it
learned its Platoaaism from Augustine, and reaHsrn was considered
its orthodoxy. W m the Scholastics began struggling with the
problem of reconciling faith and reason, soho of the basic doc
trines of Cind,siendom were forced out into the arena; of philosophic
scrutiny, Xhere seems to b© little doubt that had Augustine
lived in th© 11th. Century ho would havo argued that universale
exist apart from and transcendent to the individual objects of

sense*
A number of the Scholastics felt that in Augustine*s
realism, the particular was denied existence. But the day of the
nominalists was coming, Arab philosophers introduced Aristotelian
concepts into Spain in the 9th Century, while-Abelard began to
assert that particulars, the ‘things of this world, have a substantial

reality of their own. He followed it up with the contention
that man's chief moral weapon is his rational intellect, that
God Himself is the supremely rational. This was a long way
toward the individual from Augustine* In Augustine the function
Of intelligence is used to demonstrate the truth of a revealed
knowledge acquired by faith* Aquinas took as his task the work
of reconciling faith and rational knowledge which would restore
man to a cherished “self-respect8 and revise the Augustinian
estimate of human nature*
A. God and Creation
Aquinas starts with a concept of the universe as seen
by man. Immediately his relation to Aristotle is seen.*
Medieval Aristotelians began from the thesis that the real world
is Hie world of the senses.
From this position* Aquinas found the Hatonic-Augustinian
dualism of body and soul unsatisfactory. He held that each
individual receives from God an active intellect which can be
understood only as the Aristotelian form of body.
For Aquinas, all knowledge begins with sense perception.
FTom the data of sense, the intellect abstracts the universale
and on the basis of these it proceeds from deduction and induction
to causality and ultimate causality.^ On the basis of discovering
1Cf.

Aaima. Book IU, chap. 8,

2Cf. Being and Essence, brans. Arms (Toronto* Pontifical
Institute of Medieval Studies, 19^9), chap. IX* p. 42*
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law, order, and causality in nature, it is concluded that the uni
verse is the creation of a ©ingle uncreated infinite Being. 1
ait, -should there exist some being which is
simply the act of existing, so that the act of
existing be itself subsistent, a difference could
not be added to this act of existing. Otherwise,
it would not be purely and simply the act of
existing but the act of existing plus a certain
form* . .
Everything, then, which is such that its act
of existing is other than its nature must needs
have its act of existing from something else* And
since every being which exists through another is
reduced, as tolits first cause, to one existing
in virtue of itself, there must be some being which
is the cause of Hie existing of all things because
it itself is the act of existing alone. . • •
Evidently, then, an intelligence is form and
act of existing, and it has its act of existing
from the First Being which is simply the act of
existing* ibis is Hie First Cause* God.2
God plays the role of the prime mover in the fact of
causation and appears as a necessary being to establish the con
tingencies of sensate creation* Everywhere the universe appears
as a hierarchy of lower and higher forms. Hie world presents to
man the spectacle of incalculable order and harmony, but a har
mony of imperfect beings. The implication thus is that there is
a perfect being who controls all the visible universe.
B* Dualism
Aquinas then runs into some difficulties in his conception
of God and of necessity. Aquinas is said to have studied Aristotle
O*'

*Cf* Suama Theoloeica i.hif-,1.
^Aquinas, Being and Essence. Chap. HT, pp,

h-?.

by day and meditated ©m him by night, and from the Mast©** the
student received some problems.
One of the problems of iristotsiian philosophy is that
it set up organic growth is the model 6f'everything tdkich happens
in nature, 'the most it could do mas t# describe forms .and
qualities without offering any real suggestion as to their
genesis. Hoffding points out the problem?
Ie ^iristotlgj regarded Haturo as a.great pro
cess of development, within which the higher grades
were related to the-lower .as form to -matter.or
actuality to potentiality, bhat on the .lower stagesis only possible (potential) becomes real (actual)
on the higher.. .Aristotle himself was not able to
work but-this- significant conception..But there
can be no doubt as to the direction in which these
consequences tend* As m ecclesiastical, thinker*
however, fhomas Aquinas had to effect- m entire
break With these consequences; to •.suppress the
monism to which they led; and to set-,up a dualism
in its stead* fhis is shown characteristically in
his psychology and ethics. According t© the
.Aristotelian psychology.the soul is the ’•form11* of
the body; that which exists in 'the body as mere
possibility appears in th©\3j.f© of the soul in lull
activity end ^reality. But -such m' Intimate relation
between the soul and.' body conflicts with the,prosuppositions Of the Church, and:although.fhomas,
.follows .Aristotle to the-letter and calls the soul
the ,#f©cmw Of the body, yet, in reality, -he treats
the soul as an -altogether .different being-from the
body, as also- ho has no scruple In assuming Mformstt
without matter— in order 'to -make room, for theangelsl A Similar dualism appears in „hi-s.eihies,
-He borrows-from the freaks a number of natural
cardinal virtues, e.g. wisdom, justice,; courage*
and.self-mastery; but while, with the.freeks*
these constitute the whole-of, virtue* •he, introduces
■as -a-higher 'grade*-the three fith©olbgical** virtues?
faith, hope, and love* which arise only by super
natural means*!
'
iilarald Hoffding, Ihe He
(Hew- fork? Payer Implications,
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thought from the realm of reason* Whan in doubt* Aquinas bowed
tb .the authority of the Church. “The weightiest authority is
the Ohuroh,s custom* it should be constantly and punctiliously
observed. Ecclesiastical' writings draw their warrant from the
Church*s authority* We should take our stand on the Church*s
traditional teaching# rather than on the pronouncements of
Augustine or Jerome or any other doctor,1^- Bis faithfulness to
the Medieval ideal is consistent 'and clears reason has its
place# but the Apostolic tradition is in m danger. It is in*
violable and the Church has its custodian*
To the supreme Pontiff# who has this authority#
major difficulties are submitted . * . One faith
should be held by the whole Gbarch, TEAT IE All
m m fig $ m m m 9 m u that these be ho m n m o m
AMDHG XOU, cannot be ensured unless doubts about
the faith be decided by him who presides over the
whole Church, and whose decision will be accepted
by all* The publication of articles of belief is
like the convocation of a General Council or any
other ©oraaifceani affecting the Bniversal Church?
no other power is competent but that of the Pope.^
He reacts to Augustine’s emphasis on faith and attempts to build
a rational world somewhere between real!arm and nominalism.
Good and Evil in a naturalistic system are found in the
us® or abuse of faculties according to natural law* Esil is not
an essence but comes through second causes, as in the case of a
good artist with bad tools.
1II Quodlibets. iv, 7*
^Summa Theologies. if 10,2a-ae,

5?

0. Man and His Destiny
Man. because of his rational nature, is compelled by
necessity to seek the highest good, through obedience to the
dictates of reason he can obtain a high degree of moral recti*
tude, bat obedience to divine law and acceptance of the Divinely
given aeans of salvation are also essential to the highest
perfection which is spiritual and to the attainment of the
supreme good, which is union with God* Moral evil and good are
directly related to the intellect and will of man* It is the
province of the intellect to apprehend that which is good and
true, and the province of the will to seek that which is so
apprehended. God is rational, and Be rationally orders the
universe with regard “not only to species, but also to the
individuali}--.whieh delicate and double obligation He codifies
in natural law* In spite of his rational system, Aquinas seems
to hold with Augustine that there is some predestination, with
no reason given as to why some are elected to go to heaven and
some are left reprobate to go to hell.* The ultimate; end of man
is only to be attained in the future life and will consist
entirely |g. contemulation.2
D* Ethics
For the development of self, man must then apprehend as

ijsssa Saslsa saaias uai-m.
2Sumna Contra Oentllaa I.iii.
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much truth us Is possible through rational means* He may know
God also by means of revelation* but in the XVth book of Summa
Theoloidca. Aquinas even agrees that men may have some ,knowledge
of God by Intuition, yet says no more of it# His basio contritei&ai te mils,

ssag.fi M & hesitant and partially

m b§§3> tens* bte
The dootrine of natural law is basic for the Thomist
philosophy. The law which has eternally existed in the mind of
God is reflected in the law of nature or natural law. Man can
conform to the law of nature through his will, but partly through
ignorance and partly through the misuse of his will he has failed
to do so* Although marred by sin, man can still cultivate the
four natural virtues—•prudcjnce, Justice, courage, and self-control.
However, it is only through God’s grace that the distinctively
Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love can come to man.
Man’s best development is found in the integration of
the individual with community life* hSo all man being a part of
the city, they cannot be truly good unless they adapt themselves
to the common good.0* The integration of the individual in the
whole must be thought of as an enlargement and enrichment of his
personality, and not as a degradation to the mere function of a
part without an intrinsic value. But there was
Sfi&gaaaa

room fpr

te the Aquinas Cj3.acgp.tg o£ £he orthodox Statg.2
Art. 1 ,

2Sumtna Theologics ii.14 Qu 11, Art. 3 .

While'there a m some obvious diffiei&ties in.attempting
”i0 synthesise- veason a M faith, yet the attempt is made to
man to. conside^^Solf a National being* k part of
Christas f©statement of tbs Gommv$mm% m& eonsidehed— i,©*,
Hfhou shalt love the IoM thy God with all thy heart, with all
'

•
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.f'was- rediscovered.

CHAPTER V

THE RMAISSANCE CONCEPT OF MAN
If Aquinas* effort to give both reason and faith an
honorable place in the mind of medieval man was not completely
saiiafaotory to all, it did at least lay some of the groundwork
for the Renaissance. His use of reason up to the point of
abandoning it in each case when necessary still gave the use of
reason and confidence in an orderly universe a hearing which
would be influential later on. Nominalism* humanism* cystioism*
naturalism each contributed their part to the breakdown of the
institutional Church and paved the way for the Reformation*
A* The Renaissance Divorce of Faith and Reason!
Scotus and Occam! and Nominalism
Opposing the elements of realism in Aquinas were some
moderate realists add nominalists who first opened the wedge and
then split wide open the synthesis between reason and faith.
t

»

Dons Scotus considered that Aquinas has not given enough concern__
to the will of God and man. 3n his arguments on the Existence p£
God, he stresses the role of the will.* In his arguments on the
*Article H, Absolute Properties of God. Part I, p. j?2f.

6i
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unicity of God, he says in the second proof that MAny will that
is infinite wills things'"the way they should be willed.
God’s will is primary and autonomous* contingent on
nothing save itself. What God wills is good not because it is
rational* but because He wills it. God’s will, not His reason,
is the highest law, and it is man’s function to submit to God’s
will rather than to attempt to uphold it by human rationality.
God does not appear at the end of a logical syllogism. According
to Scotus, this was not an anti-rationalist approach? it simply
made clew the view that the rationality of man deals with the
finite only and that it is theology which deals with the infinite.
To Aquinas, there could be no real disagreement between
theology and philosophy, however inadequate the latter is in
reaching all the truths of the former. To Puns Scotus, much in
theology was philosophically improbable, yet must be accepted on
the authority of the Church. This is significant for the break
down of Scholasticism, for its purpose had been to show the
rationality of Christian truth. The difference in attitude was
important. Though he was a moderate realist like Aquinas, he
*

la id the emphasis on th e in d iv id u a l’ ra th e r than on the u n iv e rs a l.
:---- The -vo lu n ia rism ro f - Scotu s was s ig n ific a n tly d iffe re n t

from that of Augustine, for with his emphasis on the individual,
1
Allan Walter (ed. and trans.), Duns Scotus (New York!
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962), p. 86.
— ——

fee held that man has considerably more freedom of will than
either Augustine or Afinas believed, He believed in original,
sin* but held that man has not lost the power of free decision*
liiile Aquinas could still go along with Augustine in the concept
of ^irresistible grace*** Scotus would be forced to choose against
his voltmtaristlc predecessor and hold a synergistic view of
man’s salvation*
A more radical divorce of faith and reason was'insisted
on by tTiliiaJs of Occam* Only the particulars ea&et* and mm do
not have actual knowledge of things in themselves; rather mesial
concepts, ftuQ, theological doctrines are not philosopMeally
demonstrable; they must be accepted alone on the authority of the
Church and of the Scriptures. The idea of God, though not.
irrational* is one whose truth cannot be dewietrated,* 'It i#
a composite idea whose parts have been abstracted from the
various aspects of normal experience, and universale are ,
artificial products of our mental aetivity— although indispensable
to mental discourse*^ The results of Occam*s concepts were found
in both theological scepticism and mysticism. The Auguetinian
’’moment** of feeling, tied In with the antio-ilatonic tendency of
the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, make up part of the strange
combination found la Occam.3 Jn drying the possibility of
*0003% 31© Jigyga.
%1.

^

Quodlibet 1, Ques. IS*
SS^ ia^

^

3 0 f. Vilndelband, jjg»* c it * . p . 3h2*

JM££»
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"proving** God’s ea&stenee, or of uncovering His characteristics
by means of reason* be held forth an empiricism that was embar*
rasstng to the Thomists and the Institutional Church as a whole,
fie spoke on the other hand of the need of faith by claiming
Scriptures as a single source and norm of teaching of the Church,
and by ©yen attacking transubstantiation as being in conflict
with the Pope. Occam was still a long way from the impetus that
brought on the Reformation a couple of centuries later, but he
was spelling out the limitations of philosophical thought in
rejecting universale and pointing out individual things as the
only knovrables.
The force of nominalism in leading to the dissolution of
institutionalised society was effective* For nominalism, only
the individual was real, and reality could not now be character*
ized by structure and order, God, in the nominalist’s view as
sheer will, was completely free from humanly conceivable structure
or consistency. As a result, His declared intent to save sinners
could not be taken too seriously, since God might act in different
ways from His previously declared purpose.
Nominalism also had implications for society. One no
longer belonged to a social body. 'The body hoV "referred to a
group of individuals, the concept of contract between individuals
rather than that of organism was new. While the Medieval community
hardly gave man his due as a unique individual, under the impact
of nominalism the sense of belonging together and participating
in life on the basis of certain natural bonds had disappeared.

6k
And while it temporarily strengthened institutional authority to
keep some cohesion in society# it was an explosive oommunity
maintained not by natural bonds but by force.
B. Christian Humanism in the Renaissance
Christian Humanism; Scholasticism; and Valle,
Pomponaz2i# Petranea# Hcino# Boethius, Dante
When in the Renaissance that tdiich was Greek came back
again# it was not in reality Greek, for the foundation was no
longer the same. What had become fundamental for the character
of the occidental mentality was not the idea of becoming and
passing away but rather that of the divine creations of the
world and the belief in a divine providence (a divine purpose)
working toward salvation In time and through history.
fhere is to this extent then only C h ris tia n humanism in
the Renaissance period. Actually the word whumanismw itself is
not very old. It was coined by historical scholars of the i9th
Century who were interested in the so-called ^humanists” of the
iSth and 16th Centuries, the latter had received their title
from their learned efforts to revitalize the re-discovered
literature and culture of Greece and Rome. 2m this sense._____
Classical humanism might be generally described as having
♦something1 to do with human nature# and with reason as the
supreme force of human nature and as representing the Greek ideal
of man.
Baring the revival of learning in the Renaissance# it was
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not Hellenism which was revived* hut Hellenism as new understood
from the standpoint of a thousand years of Christianity*
Christian humanism, even in its most anti-religious
and anti-Christian forms* is still Christian in substance* la
Christian humanism, the fate of Christianity and the fate of
philosophy are bound together.
Christianity had provided a world-view in which there
was not the recurring cycles of fate but rather a purposive
creation.* It had also spoken of human individuality as the
direct I-Thou relationship with the Creator-God, and, in the light
of this relationship as having an eternal destiny apart from the
natural world.

Z

the attempts of the late Ancient and early Medieval
period to synthesize the Hellenistic culture with the Christian
faith had resulted in internal tensions within a Medieval system
which denigrated both the individual and reason (or the natural
world). With the first stirrings of the Renaissance, the
Scholastics set out to redefine the heritage of classical humanism.
For the Scholastics, scholarship was a Christian calling.
For Abelard as for Aquinas, dialecticsjwas ftueen of the liberal----arts, and grammar and rhetoric were her handmaidens. Truth was
a structure of true propositions about God, man, and nature. To
* Supra, pp. 9-10.
2Suora, p . 2^,

$
«

1
I

1 1 I

1

11
M

1

I

1

i

it
6

1

i

s
i
S

I

$

A
1

i

1

M

f

i

67

Aquinas each felt called in a different way to one or more of the
major tasks of the Christian scholar* to restudy the Hebraic**
Christian tradition itselff to relate this tradition to secular
culture; and to relate this tradition to scientific discovery.
The revival of classical Latin begun in the fourteenth
century* the revival of Greek began in the early fifteenth* and
the revival of Hebrew begun in the late fifteenth century brought
the full flowering of the Renaissance of which it was a precursor.
fhe revival of Classical literature tilth the concern for
the Greek ideal of man and the development of reason as a supreme
force in human nature would now challenge the Medieval structure of
the institutional Church and its enslavement of the individual.
✓

the concept of the ideal State of the Roman Stoics which had been
implemented by Augustine and interpreted by later medievalists
to build the monolithic structure of the medieval Church could be
questioned from prior sources.
Medieval asceticism and scholarship had strengthened
man*s spiritual forces but had prevented their free participation
in the work of a creative culture. To the merchant, banker,
lawyer, civil servant of cities like Venice, Florence, and Milan,
the scholastic learning of the clergy was something alien; yet
Cicero and Virgil, KLato and Aristotle had written for an urban
society not unlike their own. Moreover, it had become clear that
a

compulsory fulfillment of the Kingdom of God was impossible. Few,

68
if anyj, of the early humanists openly repudiated. the.Chwreh and
its faith, but they were scornful of scholastic philosophy and
contemptuous of monastieism.
Lorenzo Valla (1405-1^57) was fairly typical of the
prevailing critical attitude of the humanists. The critical
method developed by the humanists for the writing of Ancient
and Medieval history on the basis of authentic contemporary
documents were first applied to church history by Valla In his
famous attack on the Donation of Constantine# in which it was
shown to be a forgery. Valla questioned the authority of the
pseudo-Dionysius, and to Leo X he explained his textual revision
of the Vulgate (which seemed impious to many)? #J$r this labor
we do not intend to tear up the old and commonly accepted edition,
but to amend it in some places where it is corrupt and to make
clear where it is obscure.11 He defended hedonist^ in

Voluptate

(14-31) against the Stoat MThe rights of nature mast prevail,n he
said? •man cannot help seeking pleasure. Indeed, what is
Christianity itself but a sublimated form of hedonism.*1 He said
that the prostitute is better than the nun} she makes men happy
while the nun lives in shameful and futile celibacy. In
j& Profeagiene rellglosoram. he denied all value to asceticism and
holiness. The high regard that Erasmus held for Valla can well
be understood, and echoes of Valla seem to walk the pages of
j&e BfajjES Si
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favoring a subjective, rather than a rational, approach to God*
He has a sort of bifurcated ethics in which the sovereignty of
reason is used to consider nature and a subjective individualism
to approach God* Bis concept of striving seems as modem as
Goethe*s JSgggjfej* Fotrarca seyss

The life xm call blessed is located on a high
peak. A narrow way* they say* leads up to it. Many
hilltops Intervene* and w© must proceed from virtue
to virtue with exalted steps. On the highest summit
is sot the end of all* the goal toward which our
pilgrimage is directed. Every man wants to arrive
there* However, as Baso says? Wanting is not enough*
long and you attain it.‘* Having strayed far in error,
you must either ascend Jfc the summit g£
blessed
life under the heavy burden of hard striving, ill
deferred, or H e prostrate in the slothfulneso in
the valleys of your sins**
And Goethe says in Fausti °Hs only earns his freedom and existence /
9

Who daily conquers them anew.”

Petrarca finds the dignity and

worth of human life in the world through the possibilities of
eelf«fulfillmsrit that lay hidden in the %atural” man, beneath the
medieval deposit of supernataralism.
Ficinoi contributed by giving the Western world the first
Latin translations of Plato and Plotinus and accompanied them with
commentaries* Pool Krlsteller says (in Fera*e Matorv of

*Ernest Cassirer, et el, $hg Ranalsmice Philosophy qf Man*
(Chicagos University of Chicago Press, 1961), p* 39*
2Petrarca however envisions an end to striving* In ffauaft
the striving itself ©Sms to be an end.

71

SI® Hlatonlc Theology provided an authoritative
summary of Platonic doctrine in which Plato*s own teach
ings are blended with Heoplatonic, Christian and original
elements. The major concern of his philosophy is the
contemplative life which he Interprets as an inner
ascent, through various degrees, of the human intellect
and will toward the ultimate vision and enjoyment of
God. Since this goal cannot be fully attained during
the present life# Ficino is prompted to postulate the
immortality of the soul. . • . Ficino linked the spiritual
love between two human beings to the inner quest of the
soul for God, and coined the term “Platonic love” for
this relationship, (p. 233)
Gilson has some reservations about his “Platonism” when he says*
”We fully agree that Ficino intended to be a Platonist; our only
point is that, in trying to make Plato "Chrlsttane veritatl jfrfuriTHmmn.»
he was simply continuing the history of Christian thought in the
i
Middle Ages.” Pico, thirty years younger and a student of
Ficino, esibarked upon Christian. Mysticism. But like Ficino, he
managed to confine his speculations within the limit of orthodoxy.
Reason is divine and a gift of God.
Ficino, however# even though he was a great Platonist,
Identifies the realm of tho elect not with Goft but with gtan. This
was a rather significant change in the status of the individual, and
indicates quite sharply the ‘'Christian” humanism, and also Christian
“humanism”! He stated that Plato was inspired, and Plato must be
studied in order to make Christianity rational and acceptable to
those who are still skeptics. The highest good is not dependent
^Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the
Middle Agos (Hew Torki Random House, 1955)» P*

Upon the Church, .but 'upon a& 'impulse Universal to man, £ &
■msu by; rn m m

urge'seek truflvand. .goodness (God), letio

$$Mes the soul ©hick .ishhe attribute of -mm centrally :|n tfe©
ftt© Orders Of eadsteaco, f*f all the wonders ofaatufe, iwm is
the greatest.,
ill other thing© under -God: are always in themselves
of on© certain kind of beings this essence is at m m
all of them * * . the center of nature, the .kiddle
point of',a|l. that is, the chain of the world, pi© face,
of dll, and the toot and'bond’of -the universe,
man uses 'hid native gifts properly1, w m is Godlike in the
possession of a .rational- soul* is -God .$© above ell things, so
mail seeks to conquer the universe^

can imitate God's function

In th© universe % amusing beauty and: form .on. the lower order©
of'’creation* ;|in^iy, dine© the soul cannot uttala M s goal
her©, then© must bea hereafter; and a resurrection of the body is
necessary,

Han ha© obviously far more significance pan Plato

2

had given him, 1 -It is hot surprising to know pat' Fieino had'
planned p achieve a harmony between Plato and Aristotle,
Almost a thousand years earlier, Boethius had made the
Wfirst1* attempt to combine'Plato (neo-plai^nically_understood) and.
Aristotle, blue a neo^jaLatonit^Aueustine-in-a^Mlosonhioal^raneaiork^
Boethius had dealt with the problem of the freedom of the individual
by first offering in his Consolation of Philosophy the Stoic.resignation:
1

'Fieino .fheologlca..Blaientca ill. 2.
% « »

PP*

10,11*.
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Thinkest thou that this world is governed by
haphazard and chance? Or rather does thou believe
that it is ruled by reason? °I can,0 quoth I, °in no
manner imagine that such motions are caused by rash
chance. And I know that God the Creator doth govern
His work, neither will I ever think otherwise*0
j-Bk# i.6)
Secondly. Boethius contends that man mast be free to act or
not to act If he is to be morally responsible, for no one is
responsible for what he does under restraint. But if God foresees
the future, how can man be free? He then says that God’s
0pre~destination” consists not in foreordaining actions but in
foreknowledge only. To God, there is neither past nor future but
only present. To us, things are in time} there is an unrecoverable
past and an Unforeseeable future. To us, the future is contingent
on many things, and from our view point, we are free. The things
which are contingent to us are necessary to God.
In this sense, Boethius personifies law and determinism; and
the old Greek nemesis seems apparent as in Augustine. The divine
reason even controls fate* °For Providence is the very Divine
reason itself, seated In the highest Prince, which disposeth all
things. But Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things,
1
by which Providence conneoteth all things in.their due order.”
The freedom of man was severely limited, but an attempt
had been made to free man from the world through Stoic resignation;
and to limit the fates to foreknowledge Only rather than to make
^Boethius Consolation

6.
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the individual subject to both foreknowledge and predestination,
Ficlno had given man much greater freedom# ,
Dante, too, had attested to combine philosophies^!,e., an
Aristotelianism with a ,,Platon±cw man#
Dante draws on Aristotle (via Aquinas) for hie rationality
of man, and on Plato for the function of man., the proper function
of man is to utilise his intellect to its fullest capacity either in
speculation or in rational conduct. In the Inferno and ‘Purgatory.
rational knowledge is consumed in the eostaoy of mystical union. In
the theocratic state given by Augustine to the Middle Ages, there
was a place for everything, All that ramainedfor man was to
determine the symbolic correspondence between the lower and higher
forms of reality, and God’s wisdom will be revealed in an orderly
universe. In Canto i* 128 of Purgatory. Dante is not prepared by
the grace of God for atonement but by the command of the intel
lectual virtues,
Whereas for Duns Scotus, primitive man lived in accordance
with his own caprices; for Aristotle* Aquinas, and Dante, man is
essentially a social animal, and has never lived in isolation*
Aristotle had suggested that societies might be_gdv:eznedJar-one-man,by a small group, or by the people as a whole, but in nature, all
things are governed by one. Art and human institutions should
Imitate nature and have one ruler*
According to Aquinas, the way to avoid the possible tyranny
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of one man. which Aristotle had considered possible, the tenporal
power should be subject to the spiritual, and the king to the R>pe*
Swat, because of the pressure of God's vicar, the king will govern
for his people's sake and not for his own*
the theory of this as expressed in Dante's de

is

similar to that of Aquinas, though Dante says that the authority of
Church and State are each derived fro© God— not fro© each other,
Christ and Augustus are two suns* not the moon and the sun, which
rule in ££& Ifeaarchia (Book HI, chap* h}* Dante uses this concept
against the Church. The metaphor comes up in the concept of a
world-aonareh to rule the Terrestial paradise.1 Significantly,
when Dante crowns himself, he is crowned through the words
of Virgil, not the Pope,
It is said that Dante ends with a new man in an old
society* this is quite true. Actually hierarchical the organic
concept of society which Dante pictures was rather fully actualized
in the time of Dante and had been quite so for some time, The
hierarchical Church was as Dante boasted Christ's *Spouse and
Secretary,** and it was as essential to salvation as was the Bible*
As a redesptlve agency, It was iadispensible to man* therefore.___
it could exact its tribute of faith and submission,
1teSSt222 xvi. 9kf,
2

purgatory* Canto aovii, line 126f.

^Paradiso v. 76-78.
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The medieval Church had extended its functions and achieved
its importance on the premise that Augustine* s view of man was
accurate* Its strength lay in its unique function of mediating
between man and God, and it undertook to do for man what he could
not do for himself*
This was the Mold" society of Dante. Much more significant
for the emerging Renaissance was the concept of the ‘'new* man.
While Dante did not feel that we should be concerned about
our inability to understand all of God’s ways and purposes, **we
should rather marvel greatly if at any time the process by which
the eternal counsels are fulfilled is so manifest as to be discerned
by our reason.*** Nevertheless, the proper function of man is to
utilise his intellect to its fullest capacity, either in speculation
2
or in rational conduct. The rebirth of the 2nd Adam in Purgatory
is to be accomplished by the innate desire for good in the
intellectual virtues. Dante implies that the only way of achieving
3
the terrestial paradise is through the Intellectual virtues.
This, in spite of the fact that he separates the Soul from the
intellect in encountering the great "beyondness** of the celestial
lv. h.
2£® jtospi&a i* ^
3Cf. Purgatory 1. 62-63.
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C. Renaissance Mysticism Influence on Disestablishment
of the Institutional Church}, and the.negative Epistemology
of Cusanus.
Mysticism has a long history from the tine of Apostle Paul
and his Damascus vision through the dubious Christian orientation of
Dionysius the Areopagite to the classical figures of the Medieval
mystical tradition including Bernard, and Meister Eckhart. Common
to the mystics was the conviction that God could be directly
experienced, though in essence He remained incomprehensible.
1* influence on disestablishment of the institutional
Church
Although the Church Insisted that God was known and mediated
through the sacramental system, mysticism was not Initially considered
a serious threat. !$rstics were incorporated into the fold and
they comprised one component, though a subordinate one in the medieval
synthesis* Bven Dionysius the Areopagite, who was more Greek than
Christian, was incorporated into the fold because of M s alleged
connection with St* Paul (Aquinas quotes him extensively).3.
Only then the individual mystics were supplemented by the
-corominitiesofnnyMlcM“orieaitation_did-the7aifficultyiippear, neither
the individual cystic nor the mystical group wanted to undermine the
witness of the Church which was thq Medieval institution. But they
*Cf• latourette, History of Christianity. (New York11Harpers &
Bros., 1953), PP* 210-211.
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I
gospel which ho freelatoed spoke to these people*

a mmm&

Augustinian raystioiswi with the rigors of its sons© of sin found
4 heading, and eve® 'those who had. no partiouian Interest In a
Hystieal relalMMeishlp- to God could not© 'that there were those who
need not be m dependent on the Institution,
naturalists alike reversed the Uicene formula*

test mystics and
they approached God

through nature rather than nature through God with an optimism 1®
which everything m$ construed as good 'and: man -as being potentially

60
GttMMit oonooiTo* of fcaaulsdg#
unitas*

Thought

mb

m

th* ttfclYilgr uhiah ooubdnos anA

only approach th* absolute unity by asans of

a aystioal intuition in which all. the radii of axistttteo coats
together in a single eontor. fha

«misuaaatlon of

thought aloe

ppaswras it* cassation* But, thought w i t prooood £roat plurality
and

1

idea quits probably roosivod fro* JBakhart.

0* bsliarod tbit a m cannot irsnsaond Units dotorainaiiona,
and tints hi afuntuslly osnsludad that Ood i* lnooaqirsfconaiblo.
Philosophically esnaidorsd, God is knum by «*gati«u Bad can b*
thought 1f by tin abolition of all ersatod eharactoriatioa which
ha doss not possess*

2

Busan naturo* Cusarns thinks, i* 1a itsalfnods nsithsr
■ora air 1 m s hy tha birth m i death of individual faunsn beings*
fho final implication is that ooarything baa its basic reality
in the w y m i tiuth which is
God is thus tbs mprcets
%
univsraal.
fits 8»ly Spirit is th* bond if Batura* and is on*
with Batura as tho son if all that nation brings about*

Cusazms

nakas no distinction between sotnoidcnca (eoiaoidantle)* oonprohcnsioit
(*OMplloat1»)> and union (owasxla) of opposites* though th* thro*
tanas domta ueey Atifuwit relation*.
%a**eia Boron (tra»a»), Blobolas Cusamio*
(londsnt Bwtledg* and Pawl, 195*0» p.

^QbUL*# 1* 2b»26*
u. 2*3*

iMXSM.
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His concept of the dignity of the individual is that
whan the inhabitants of the earth are more perfect) the.closer
they approach the ideal which is in harmony with their nature. Bat
it does not follow that this ideal must be the same as that of the
inhabitants of other heavenly bodies or the same as other creatures.
Shis is significant. Shis, as it was earlier pointed out (pp. 23*25),
is the limitation of the Stoic individual, That is, man in
Stoicism is not free to be a ^different** individual.
Cueanus notes this and brings into the Renaissance period
this Judeo-Chrlstian concept of individual liberty?
Svery creature, as such, is perfect, though bycomparison with others it my seem imperfect* God in
His infinite goodness gives being to all in the way
in which each can receive it. With m m there is no
jealousy; a© communicates being without distinction; arid,
since all receive being in accord with the demands of
their contingent nature, ©vezy creature rests content in
its own perfection, which God has freely bestowed upon
it. Hone desires the greater perfection of any other;
each loves by preference that perfection which God has *
given it and strives to develop and preserve it intact.
Two other areas of his thought should be cited that will
shew up in contra*distinction to Luther*© irystlcism as contri
butions to individuality. The first can be noted as a unio*
mystical experience?

______ _j

Let us brace ourselves that each one aspireby daily'
mortification to rise by steps to untion with Christ,-,
even* as far as may be, to the deep union of:absorption
in him. Such a one, leaping above all visible and 1^ . »

p . 75 .

_____
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mundane things, reaches the complete perfection of
his nature,1
%eondi^, the relation of body-soul stands closer to the
Greek concept of duality than the Christian concept of body-soul
monism, in comparing Cusanus with Inther. Cusanus seems to find
immortality in the individual soul rather than in a **relationship**
2
to the Creator.
Cusanus seemed to have few followers^ the uniqueness of his
contribution earns him a significant place in the contribution to
the concept of individual liberty. We will consider some of the
problems of his epietemology and its limitations in the next chapter*
2h general, the egression of Renaissance mysticism was a
part of an antl-rational approach to philosophy-theology which
took its place alongside the emphasis on rationality. As we
noted in Dante, the celestial paradise was reached fay a combination
of Intelleetualisra and Soul, in the late Renaissance, the mystical
approach to reality (God) became a chief alternative to the
Scholastic tradition which the reformers held in such contempt*
lather wrote from Wittenberg in 151?t
Our theology and St. Augustine are progressing
happily and prevail at our University, Aristotle is
at a_discount and is-hurrying-to everlasting-destruction. People are quit© disgusted with the lectures on the
Sentences (of Peter Xombard), and no one can be sure
of an audience unless he expounds this theology, i*©, ,
*Ibid., p* I65*
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the Bible or St. Augustine, or seme other teacher of
note in the Church.1
Adolf Uamack has said that without a revival of Augustinianlsm,
the Reformation would have been impossible.2 lather*a cardinal
doctrine of justification by faith alone and Calvin’s restatement
of the dootrines of original sin and predestination reach back
through the rational theology of Aquinas to the Bishop of Hippo.
This is noted by Augustine’s own testimony in the seventh book of

the StMfaftifaiM* to a close bond, with Neoplatonism and its
accompanying mysticism, The mystical traditions, as we have
Indicated, carried its own unique witness to man's individuality.
0* The Renaissance and Sramus} Reaction to"Humanism;
Man Subservient to

Season to be a Guide? and

a Mxed Contribution
The humanists stressed the greatness and nobility of man.
The impact of this concept on the Medieval Community was greater
than the attacks which some of the scholars made upon specific
documents and claims of the institutions. It represented an
outlook on life which was one of reform and change. And, in.that
connection, the nobility of man was found in Cicero and Plato rather
than in scholastic theology.
i
Quoted by Hartman Grisar, lather (trans. by E.M. Lamond,
I, 305.
%

Adolph Haroaok, The History of Dogma (New York# Dover
Publications, 1961), p. 17,

8h

Thus, In the Ronaissance, a decentralization took place
suddenly liberating man* s creative forces. The Middle Ages had
concentrated and disciplined man’s spiritual forces, but at the
same time had curbed them. Under the impact of humanism, there
was also spiritual decentralisation, and men’s lifo became secular,
and even religion was secularized*
The prince of the northern humanists, Erasmus, played a
large part in aiding the Renaissance, not as a particularly
original thinker but by his scholarly work of translation of the
Bible and numerous tracts and writings espousing the humanist cause*
i.

Reaction to Humanism

Erasmus was convinced that Classical studies were the
cure-all of the civilized world, However, there were periods
towards the latter part of his life when he would, if necessary,
join in battle against those humanists who would become purists.
2h 1528 (eight years before he died), Erasmus published two
dialogues in one volume— one about the correct pronunciation of
latln and Greek, and one entitled Ciceronianus. The first was
philological, and the last was satirical as well. In them, he
ridicules the purists among the humanist camp* He had earlier
discussed what he considered the excesses of the classical humanists
•among all sorts of authors none are so insufferable to me as those
apes of Cicero.Huizinga suggests that this may be the aged
*Huizinga, ja&smp. an£

of Reformation, p. 1?0.
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Erasmus in a path, of reaction which might have eventually led him
far from humanism, possibly even down the path to Christian
1
puritanism. But certainly in his letter to Luther in May of
1519# he was a long way from it*
As for me, I keep myself as far as possible neutral,
the better to assist the new flowering of good learning?
• . ♦ As for the schools, who should not so much reject
them as recall them to more reasonable studies* 'Where
things are too generally accepted to be suddenly eradi
cated from men* s minds, we mast argue with repeated and
efficacious proofs and not make positive assertions*
a* Han Subservient to .Hubris
the Oreek principle of moderation la all things must be
followed even in a revival of learning and in study*
Studying must not be carried to an extreme, says Erasmus.
He writes to a young man, Charles Blount, saying that he will
dedicate some writings to him*
. . . bearing in mind what an insatiable glutton, so
to speak, your father has always been for history (and
not that you resemble him in this also)* * * * 1
should not wish you to resemble your father too closely.
He is in the way of pouring over his books every day
from dinner until midnight, which is wearisome to his
wife and attendants and a cause of much grumbling
among the servants! so far he has been able to do this
without loss of health! still I do not think it wise
for you to take the same risk*
p-173»
2Ibtd>* pp. 230-251.
3fbid.* p* 251.

@f Thomas f&>©r@ he saids
It 4s all too true that Thomas Jfoore has been long in
prison and his fortune confiscated. It was being said
that he too had been executed* but 1 have no certain
news as yet* Would that he had never embroiled himiad left the the©**
Sin©© man must do all things in moderation* an ideal
society will show the marks of temperate Individuals who make Up
that society* Disturbance .and .controversy'- are to be avoided*
even at the. cost of the loss of an Idea, or honors,
Erasmus is therefore met concezned at the disruptive
effect of lather*© work* he writes to Bather in April of 152b,
after W M m . a£ H i S t t

his own rebuttal entitled mstribe

had been published*
But it does not matter what happens to us two, least
of all to myself who must shortly go hence, even if the
who!© world were applauding net it is this that
distresses m t mi all the best spirits with me* that
with that arrogant* impudent, seditious temperament of
yours- you are pattering- the whole .globe .in ruinous,
discord* exposing good .men and lovers of good, learning
% certain frenzied Pharisees, arming for revolt the
wicked and the revolutionary* and in short so carrying
on, * * *4
* * * it is the .public disaster which distresses me*
and the irremediable confusion of everything.-5
In a letter- to -Marin- Bucer
I

■■From a mtter to Batomus, 1535* .Ibid,* p. 252.
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continues in the same veins
Ion assemble a number of conjectures as to why I
have not joined your ohurch. . . . the third thing which
deterred me is the intense discord between the leaders
of the movement. * . I have never approved the ferocity
of leaders, but it is provoked by the behavior of
certain persons.
Erasmus so hated disturbance and controversy that he would not
openly admit to the authorship of The Praise of Folly. Any
kind of disruption including war he abhorred. In Julius Exclusis.
he pours out Ids hatred of war. All things should be decided by
reason and dialogue. He may have criticised the Church and said that
the Pope was deluded, but would do so only if such criticism
could be accomplished without furor.
Erasmus defended his criticism of the ecclesiastical
institution which was considered to have been effective*
Certain rascals say that my writings are to blame for
the fact that scholastic theologians and monks are in
several places becoming less esteemed than they would
like, that ceremonies are neglected, and that the supremacy
of the Homan Pontiff is disregarded! when it is quite clear
from what source this evil has sprung. They were
stretching too tight the rope which is now breaking, they
almost set the Pope's authority above Christ's, they
measured all piety by ceremonies, and tightened the
hold of the confession to an enormous extent, while
the monks lorded it without fear of punishment, by
now instigating open tyranny. As a result 'the
"stretched string snapped,* as the proverb has itj'it
could not be otherwise.

^Xbid.. p. 2^h’»
%bld.. Letter to Martin Bucer, p. 2h5.
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X have approved of the abolition of the Mass, even
though I have always disliked these mean and moneygrabbing mass-priests. There were other things also
whieh could have been altered without causing riots
(underlining Is mine),’
But Erasmus always exhibits caution* ♦•lorn will have the good
sense not to circulate this letter, lest it cause any distur
bance.1,2
3. Season to be a Guide
The use of reason and the calm discussion of scholars in
search for truth is one of the expected occupations of mm* Wan
must be not only trained but able to ascertain truth for himself.
Uneducated, man is a wild beast,butproperlytrained,

he is a

divinity. Thus it wouldnaturallyfollow that Erasmus detested
the Augustinian doctrine of total depravity. Emotionally, he
was the heir of Aquinas, who had been unable to accept the notion
that God imposed punishment for sins beyond man*s control.
Providence, Aquinas argues, produces every grade of being* some
things are strictly determined by "necessary causes,*’but
others, such as man, react to “'contingent causes,*1 Thus guilt
proceeds from Hie free will of the person who is reprobatedand
deserted by grace. Erasmus seek& rational grounds for an
intuitive attitude, since at the core of his faith, ignorance is
W’«n

1ibid.. p. 24d.
2Ibld.. p. 240,

iifj*nuiH«*i— w—frnrnmm
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vice, and knowledge is virtue. The alleged “bondage of the vill“
is merely bondage to ignorant opinion which may be rectified by
“diligent instruction and wise counsel.w The wisdom and goodness
of God are manifest in man’s ability to choose rationally between
Alternatives. Grace is indispensable, but a free will is too.
It was on the basis of his emphasis on reason and freedom
of wiH that he effectively criticized the institutional church,
and a highly structured society.
h. A Mixed Contribution
Was Erasmus a reformer, a conservative humanist, a
professional aesthete, or a heretic?
He upheld man’s native depravity as a Church position in
the Enchiridion. Erasmus seems to be the prince of the northern
humanists--but clearly shows his orthodoxy and conservatism.
The Bock on which Erasmus and Luther split was the question
of free-will. Luther (and Calvin) could be satisfied only with
a complete refusal of Thomistic rationalisms that man should
presume to know God through his puny reason was to them as
abhorrent as that God Himself was circumscribed by reason.
Erasmus cannot think of God save as essentially rational,
or of man as essentially good if he only used his God-given reason
in the service of piety. The whole of man’s excellence was
epitomized in his faculty of reason, and to think of him as
congenitally depraved and therefore unable to use his reason in
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dichotomies implicit or esj&ictt daring the previous centuries
were released to mSbl© the struggle to earey ©»i» open conflict*
Th© Christian spirit wtfoti1

transcended the limits of th© world

and dtseovoxNad heaven eouM not conceive ©f life as-closed and
assfianeiit as has* to© das steal, trorid* Th© humanist spirit denotes
the elevation and setting up of 'dan in the center of-the universe
with no anabling power except as apart,of.nature# if nan derives
his dignity from nature, Ihe httJaaa spirit than is transferred
from the center of .the world to th© periphery. Paul Tillich, in
a discussion of mpranaiuraMsm and mturalism, saysi
. An idea of tod tableh overcomes .the conflict of
iwd ^ p y^y^faiyali<m
b©
wS©lf»
transcendent** or ^ecstatic** 3h order to .make, this
(tentative owl'pyoiitn^oftay) choice of words >ai©d©vet^nd^d *,
m may distinguish three ways of interpreting the
moaning of the term *GddU*
Th© first one separates God as a being* the highest',
being,
all other beingo, alongside .and above -which
he has his existence. M this framework he has brought
the universe into being ;• * * governs it # .# * interferes
in its ordinary processes in older to overcome resistance
and to - m a n M s purpose* and wftSi bring it tocon*
summation in a final catastrophe • . ; this isa
primitive form of. sapi^naturalisa# * # .
The second way of interpreting th© meaning
ofth©
tern ^God* identifies God with th© universe* with its
essence or with special powers within it* God-is the
name for power and meaning of reality* Be is not
identified with th© totality of ..things . . * but he is
a symbol of th© unity, harmony, and power of being; he
Is th© dynamic and .creative center of reality*!
iPaul Tillich, Svgfcematic Theology <Ghleago* Tfeiv. of Chicago
frees, 1957),

U» dff. Yl™

™
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This latter describes a type of naturalism which could
fee acceptable to Platonism, Aristotelianism, and humanism* Bach
could agree that man’s rational soul was his crown and his
beatitude, and as such, has a royal dignity. Through his reason,
i.e., the faculty of his highest level of soul, man may attain
genuine knowledge, or life* He may achieve a life of temperance
and rational well-being, or may become like the God whose divine
attribute of reason he alone among animals shares* Reason employs
the service of the will which then puts the body in motion. Only
a few iconoclasts like Seoius and others (men like Jfechiavelli
and Calvin) would make the will supreme.
Naturalism contributed to both individuality and collectivism.
The individual was free from the societal structures of man, unless
he re^subjected himself to their dtctums by understanding the
human institution® a® truly symbolic of nature, let, man as in
the Platonic scheme becomes a nart. not a center of creation
except by use of his reason. Season, then, not man* is the center
of the world, This was substantially the position of the Stoics.
The paradox of Reo-3toicism is that while they advocated
ruthless individualism, they presupposed an immutable law of
providence. It is an optimistic deismr*~but remains deism..
•t
Cf. Supra, pp. thff.
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suoti a universe# ^Abstractions11 like Platonic Justice are
unthinkable, and knowledge (a© Hobbes -was to argue many centuries
later) could rely upon nothing but the data of sensation, Mmt
we know of the world we know alone through sensation, VJhea our
knowing© is wrong it is so baoause we have misinterpreted the
data of seas®, Greek' ethics were derived from a rationalistic
metap^sies and held the good life to fee one of rational
fulfillment for man, the microcosm who* like the macrocosm# had
many parts, Efchios were thus, imanenti man had, within him a
rational- faculty that* if ho allowed it to do so, would guide him
1
always upward to the good life,
■3« Neo-Sfcoieal Naturalism
The rise of Meo-Stoicisra in the late Renaissance is m
example of recurrence of ideas with variations***!*©,* as
Augustine attempted to synthesis© Platonism and New Testament
thought, Xipsius tried to merge Stoicism and Christianity, Justus
Upslus and Gtiillam© Du fair revived th© Stole catchwords about
fortitude and self-reliance, Upslus tries very seriously to
escape the charge of mechanistic determinisai by listing, four
2

different Mads of destiny.

As a Christian* lipslus admits the pagan Stoics were not
too careful in discussing fate* but that they had the best Concept
1- 1 -i.n r ; r ...
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^Ibid,, U» TAi
2Cf, Twe Boakes of Constancifi. 1, xx*
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of the majesty of God existent among the Ancients,

It remains

for lather to revive the truly Hebraic concept of a God of
majesty and basic concern for each particular individual.
Sumat»v
Generally speaking the essay has contended two things?
1. With the Greeks* Homans, and Christians from
ASgustine to Aquinas, we have developed a sort of ontological
morphology in which we noted that if creation or fabrication of a
world is made the central concept in a cosmology* then individual
freedom in the world is* eerrelatively severely limited or
altogether eliminated.
2. In our discussion of Valla* et al, we have shown that
immediately preceding, and during huther*s time, there Is a new
experience of man in the world incompatible with the cosmological
causal view* ihe Augustinian formula of “go within yourself, for
there the truth lies1* is translated into “go out into the world* for
that is man’s destiny and freedom.“
On the basis of a new religious experience, iuther (in his
mysticism) reconciles these two contrary tendencies, preserving
both. In doing so, he transforms the concept of individual freedom,
by making central not God as Cause* but God as rtself*giving*“ With
his concept of servo arbltrio. Iuther reverses neo-Stoicism.
*Cf. Ibid., i, xviii.
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Now, having traced th© various thoughVeontributidns to
the problem of liberty, let us conclude this endeavor by probing
how Martin luthier contributed to this problem in terras of the
development of a Christian individual, Bat before preceding to
the heart of the matter, at the outset, we should be reminded
that*
The Humanism of Italy bore the stamp of an Intellectual
aristocracy. Its great significance lay In the founding
of a free
life, |*ut as to how it wag
M M ) m m U M l a m a t MM&m*
Mails m&SSM&Si* ^underlining mine/ It left the
Church, the State, and the life of the community to
look after themselves, while it occupied itself almost
entirely with intellectual and aesthetic problems.
Even Machiavelli himself, in spite of his great interest
in national and political affairs, forms no deception
in this respect, for that which fascinates him most is
the development of the power of the Prince, and.he did
not trouble himself as to the more hidden powers and
conditions of social life. * » . the Reformation is
the application of the thought of the Renaissance to
religion, by which I do not mean that Iuther and
Zwingli first adopted these ideas, and then applied
them, the greatness of their personality consists
precisely in this* that they discovered these thought?
anew ip their own experience of life, and clothed"them
lafcaal,
maintained that
direct personal experience of life is the real founds*
tion of religion, and taking their stand on this, they

M m wMmU m

ism*

fought against the Church and the theology of the
Middle ages. Man’s inner powers were freed from arti
ficial forms. Christianity was here, really brought back—
to use Machiavelli’s expression— to the original principle
from which it had sprung.
. ♦ * ^ means of a dose personal -union with Christ,
men are raised above all external circumstances# » . *
M Personality is thus to be freed in those innermost
relations on which its eternal fate depends from all
eternal authority, a similar freedom can hardly fail
^underlining mine/ to be effected in other spheres*1
The interrelatedness of Biilosophy and theology, and
the contribution of Duther can then be shorn first in his concepts
of God and Creation in contrast with Christian humanism*
Ernest Cassirer saysI
Si the Renaissance the philosophical and religious
Issues were combined!
It was precisely the Scholastic character of
Renaissance philosophy that made it impossible to
k t e a pMlRg>^4pal, and .rgli^ou^ isgueg.*
The most significant and far-reacshin.g works of philosophy
in the Quattrocento are and remain essentially theology,
their entire content is concentrated in three great
w M m & M*

$* Inther’s Unique Contribution to the Context of
the Individual
lather*s ooncept of God is not derived from creation gg» from
knowledge about creation either negatively or positively. There is
W a l d Hoffding, 4 ffiftgac S&JMmk B M m M S L (Kw t o m
Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), I* 38-39*
^Emest Cassirer, Wyidaul agd thg Cosmog. iji jjenaigsaace
Philosophy (New fork! Harper & How, 1964), p. 4,
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in Medieval thought a striving after the great and infinite,
combined with an endeavor to introduce into its great thought*
construction all the elements of world knowledge which it
possessed* First, the world of nature as depicted by Aristotle;
second* the world of grace which Christ had revealed to the world;
and third and highest of all, the prospect of the eternal world
of glory# the ideal was a harmonious, ascending series of natura#
gratia* gloria* such that the higher spheres did not interrupt, but
rather completed the lower spheres.
It would seem, however, that the real Aristotle, not the
one of the Thomist interpretation, represents an idea of God
which# though it may possess certain theistic features, is not
only very different from the Christian doctrine but also incompatible
with it. The God of Aristotle is neither a ’’lord-God** nor a
Creator; God is not even the One who freely elects, nor the one
who stoops down to man.
According to Aristotle, the Deity stands in lonely selfcontemplation outside the world; for man He is an object
of awe and wonder, to know Him is the highest task of
man’s intellect; this divinity is the goal towards which
all that is finite aspires, whose perfection evokes
man’s love; but just as he cannot expect to receive love
in return, he cannot receive from this divinity any
effect at all that differs from that of nature, and his
intellect is the sole means by which he enters into
contact with Him#
•• -•^Zeller, Die Philosophie der Grlecheru II, I, p. 791 as
quoted by Sail Brunner in The Christian, Doctrine o£ God.
Philadelphias Westminster Freso, 1950), p* 152#
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governed simply by M s WOrd and by Slat alone.
was done.**

it 1© h©r© that m

**Se ©poke and it

have a radical t o m In lather ©a

the basis of td&ob responslMMty la and for the world will be

assigned a new plac©*^
& a sermon on Romans il#3>36* lather agrees that knowledge
experience, b u ^S t
Osanpi thereby understand God*s easencet
For the reason and wisdom of man may indeed, by the
exercise of their own powers, arrive at the conclusion,
although feebly that there cast be only one eternal,
divine Essence, which has created, which sustains and
governs, all things . . » fbis is a knowledge a raat&rtorl*
Which looks at God from without, seeing Bin in M s tfoffe©
and government, past as we look at the exterior of a
castle or house end from this form m opinion about the
character of the lord or householder* Bat & priori
human wisdom has never yet been able to conceive t&at
God Is within Mmself, and what the nature of M o Internal
essence is*
Bor can anyone, besides those to Whom it has been revealed
by the BoXy Spirit, know or say anything definitive about
the Bature of the divine Essence. St* M l says
(I Oor* 2j11)j ^Hhat man Imowetb the things of a man
save the spirit of a man which Is tot Mm? Evan, so the
things of God knoweih no man bat the Spirit of God.*
Outwardly 1 may, of course, see what you are doing; but
X cannot see your Intentions or thoughts* On the other
hand, you cannot know what X am tMn!dng unices, by word
or sign, I enable you to understand it*
Much less can m see and knew what God is in M e own
secret Essence until the Holy Spirit, who, as St* Bwil
saya at the same please, %©akdw>th all thing©, yea, the
deep things of God* reveals it to us.z
pp* 108ff.
^Quoted l» What lather Share* an anthology, <St* louies
Concordia fUbllsbtog House, 1959), 2X» 539-5^#
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Moses calls the tbrd.'' lather renews the concept of the world
aa a purposive creation of God. ■ lie reaches this conclusion
from the giVenmt£ss of th© revelation hr the i}Eoly ^irii,1* md

rn% w reason, God, he says, is. manifested through Bis ttorks
snd-'M# Word* l^atever else belongs essentially to the S&vtnity
cannot he- grasped md 'understood, such as being outside time,
before the worlds etc*2'
lutfesr maintains that God m t ine&^rehemslbio before the

m m U . m of the » yM , md trn after creation, So is within,
without, and above all eyeature$*«and is still inco»gjreheBsible.

the difference between -the origin Of man .sad that- of
Oattl© also points to the immortality of the soul, of
which w© have previously spoken. Htfeough the remaining
works of-Sod arc perfect Objects of wonder and are very
this nevertheless proves coi^XusivQly that manIs the most outstanding creatures whoa Gad creates him,
la takes counsel and employs a net procedure.. He does ’
sot leave it to the earth t# produce Mm, like the
animals and the' trees* Hut is Ilbsself shapes 'Mm
according to
as if he wore God*s partner and _
one who would m p j God's rest* .ted so Mam. is a
dead and Inactive clod before he is formed- by the lord.
God takes that clo d and. forms from it a most beautiful
creature' which has a share In imaortality.3
God picks'to control man, and man. by divine commission is tocontrol the rest- of creation, throughout man's entire life, he %n^er'S'-^rks. '1*1*, $* 9.
%bid.. p. If, ¥e will at a later point consider his concept
revealed, knowledge.

will apart from God’s action in regard tc relationship with M s
■freatpr;

Along with the nominalists, he -emphasizes the individual

I

*

t
t

1
f

B

*§

m
of lorn xtm does for God must be fro# and imcontraineG, and this is
possible as lather sees it only when the will has been set free
by God*s aetioni By “passive

h# anea^atlv: means

that the only possibility of.upward movement of man lies .in,what
ean.be, donoto him rather than, anything .that nan.,be .dene.

hira.^

.tall, Brunner has. observed that in his younger days lather
bsp#tt doable- predestination ,(wm-|s:,|g*edestined,;to be .either

%

“saved9 or “damned9}, later givingit ,up.

W#M.ll consider

the setting for this concept in the next .section of- this chapter
under the title “lather and l^stielsm.“ let-as first summarise
lather*® contribution to "the: Eenaissa&ee concept of the %orldi*:
or “God and Creation*9
The “world9 in which the .individual was.. Set. as conceived
by lather was a world created, as a voluntary act of will by a God
with a loving purposes
I should .beliefs that. 1 am <§od*s creature that he has
..given- to m body, soul, good eyes, reason, a good wife*
children* "Helds'. • .'he.has given, to me the'four
eluents * * » ay life* ny five'senses * * ,3
Created by God* according to lather, the entire world Is
therefore responsible to Mm;

As a.consequence*- the individuaX is.

•■*&ins Scotus $0.4 .
.
^iail Braniier*. & * . & £ & $ & & J B M & & £ & ■ C%^Hnster m m ,
19 W h P* 168.
Aloha I&lliaberger, Martin lather (Garden. City, M.J.s Doubleday
end Co., inc,* 1961), -.pp.; 208f. "
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free to accept all citation as his rightful domain to role#
Including many areas previously considered inferior, and therefore
unavailable for ms© or development by maw* Hatter, seat, and
reason are golteproper for man's use# The metaphysical monism
or a cosmos tMch is either God or created by God finds the
entire "world" of the. individual larger than that of the Hellenists
who deprecated matter; and is more inclusive than Augustine, along
with the monastics who considered the body and sex, as under
suspicion! likewise more Intellectual freedom than the Medieval
world tendency which did not encourage the full use of reason.*
lather is arguing as follows*
By assigning responsibility to God for the way in which the
world is constituted in and for man* a freedom accrues to man. In
the first place, he is freed from the burden of responsibility
for how and why the world Is the m y it is. In the second place,
removal of this responsibility discloses a Whole realm, a field
in which he can act* That is, by shifting responsibility to God,
bother affirms the theoretical necessity of predestination, the
full sense of which is only acknowledged and actualiaabl© at the
level of divine thinking and action-*© level which totally escapes
man so far as he conceives "Being in the world" as the fundamental
sense determining his existence as m individual* Luther thus
shifts the responsibility for the manner in which (or how) the
*Cf. Supra, p. h9, lines 13ff.

■vs
I

§

I

s
s

m

©

I
1

a
^©
«®
rt
1

I i

*

i

$

a
<©H
©
O
I

43

S
45

* I

1

8

f

33

f

“

and sub le t
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I
1
*
Older remains a. mystery* civile

the human order remains in te lU lg ib le

to the workings of man*

were* has le ft

the world

to

mm$; and

in this

so far as the Individual is

concerned,. Sod"© plan cannot bo superiiqposed
dojse$n*«l»e** there is no longer that
isorffiorphissj necessary

for

sense* God, as i t

on

the ta w tt

(theologies!} causal

such saperiapositionj -for the world is

no .longer apprehended, as Ke ifo e ttt of a *cau$sH which transcends it *

freMom~«*is resolved by inther in an ingenious way, ft© introduces

& %©n*oausaX« concept of'.a %elf**givingw Sod~~i.o.9 a rMleally
transformed roMen of Space# an UeMstenti&l,'1 not ‘"causal,**
1
reference to the presence of idbd among the faithful.
From the view jmst stated, it follows that since all of the
properties of the world are- created by#, and retain their dependence
on, the loving Hareator-Ck)d,M m m of them limit the individual,
Han’s dignity or individuality is m% dependent upon"the acuteness
of his senses, the amount of 'hie rationality# M e personal
limitations# nor the authority of other indiMduals* M s unique
freedom is to be subject alone to- the loving Creator.
fbs %erldtt dr content- of mther’s individual# m far as he
is one of the faithful, extends beyond the limits- of this life
into full realization in relationship to fSe&i
I believe that Jesus 'Jurist, the true Bon of -god has
become my lord* * * * fbr after- we had been -created#, the
devil deceived us and became our lord* But now Christ
frees us from death# the devil, and sin# and gives us
2
righteousness# life# faith# power# salvation# and- wisdom.
lather contended that this relationship was a completely free
gift given fey the Odd who had first created men,
for bather, -the entire cosmos including access to‘the
Creator Himself was available, to the.-claims'of man.- ihe way in ...
*A similar, but by no means identical# view is discussed
by George Qnsdorf# bk .simifiMfion timtiaad M M .HbArM# Paejob,
Pous, 1962, pp, 92ff.
23UlllnbG?g.er, gp. cit., p. 210,

vhiah thi* ana t© bo roaliaod by tfco individual -was throagfc
»**»* *doh « m

aiailar and y*t gait* dLfforont iron tho *•©*

plutwlit lad A*H rittfl1iii m thrift or gw w * ■aohlmtlftn a# tko
two.

Iath#r*a yatiiat* opiatonelogy dapanda an a

mAqmm

Jtrotioin*, which JbUy aat«*3i«** tbo a*K-*ivi»i «f 0od.

Wa

•hell anasdna tbi# In It* hiotoHaal cosfcaaet la tfaa JMcrt soction.
If

M M r «aC~*n*«ian*i **»•«•***«**, Joiftt«tiKUn» an*

Xntfear** Jfratieiisn.

I# H«o*ylatonic W(r»tisis«i

Hi* oanaiibatlv# alomant ia ayattat®# ic th* isnadlacy of
oentaot with daitr* tfcnaugh inan> ncporlonot, without th* vodiatiw
•f roaoonins* fhojr njrrtiaiso of rlotinuo bos thro# oXgaifieant
«har*eto»i*U«*t

(1) it i* an aooonding MqaiaiUYo ayatieianj

(2) it i* an intolloobual ^r«ti«i«; and (3) it ia • poyaooaXXty

afeaoxbiat nyvtloi**.
2bi anawa* ta th# *34 Arabian* *Haw flam th# feta, bains
anteh «i

m

bar* dooavibad Hi*, anything wHabavar baa oubotanco,

iaatoad of th* On# abiding by Hlmaolf," JOotinua rapXtaa*

I*t a* oalX *9*a Gad Binaalf b«f*r* wo -On* woowr^-nat
with nttarod warts* bat *i*#t«hAiig forth atir ^pojO^Iri
p*wy«r to Kj» for thia i# th# only wojr in whtab no aan
jwayv alamo to Hi* ids* la aX#no. bb awat* than, gaaa
ujxwi M m in th* innar part of ua» a* in a toapX#, bains
»» So i* by ilnooif, abiding artdll and b#y#nd all thing*.
Srorythinf tiiat nova* naat Hava an *b£#*t t*wn*4 whiah it
novoa. pat th# ana baa no #ueh #bj#«t; oanaassuantly
g§ y s t not tff**4 navanant
£&* . , , Lai a* not

think of production in time, -when m .speak of thing©
eternal . . , It had its being without Bis,assenting
or willing' or being moved In. anywise * ; **
In ‘
fee mysticism of Hotlms, there is an attempt to
achieve intuitive knowledge fey a mystical union with the One.
ibis is topically Hellenic with the acquisitive individual seeking
knowledge or the Sivine idea in an egocentric “world.1* It is
what is called “acting1*aygttoi0% •wherein the individual socks
contact with the deity .in spontaneous performance. this is
different from a %eaotlng** nysticism, in which the action of the
individual is an action in response* in the aysiietsm of Hctinus,
we have acting mysticism.
Plotinus states that the One has no object* jag, ge must not
assert movement of the One* Be also states that the only object
of the Bees is the One. It is an ascending mysticism, based on
the acquisitiveness of the ‘♦lower1* form. the motive is ego*
centric* and is to fee fulfilled in a higher form;
There are illustrations of this in the magical mysticism in
the Greek mystery religions. The believer attains* fey means of
initiation* union with divinity* and thereby becomes a partaker
Is the immortality for which he yearns* Through these sacraments*
he ceases to be a natural mas and is bom again into a higher
state of feeing. Mian the conception of the universal is reached*
the resultant mysticism becomes widened* deepened* and purified.
^lameades j>. 1. 6.

the entrance

the super*earihly and eternal takes place

through the act-of thinking. Ions raises itself above th©
Illusion of th© smses

makes it regard itself a# in

bondage i© the present lif©«*t© th® earthly and temporal. _th©
individual becomes absorbed into the on© in mystical onion# th©
rasult 1© that, while th© individual is freed from transcience*
J& fab destroyed as an Individual.
2.

iwgusfinian >ysticism/

the Nominalists carried the onion with God. back to the
concept ©# a.personality destroying' »§rsticisra with. the -union of
the individual « m with God as a goal and aeeomplisimani of the
mystical experience# IfMl©, this m s an. attempt t© liberate th©
individual from the limits of reason# it .©ads .in th© complete
as in the $©0~platcmist mysticism.
It it not hard than I© understand th©. sens© in ©bleb
1
Cusanus speaks of th© absorotipn of the- individual, If Cusanus
■means by this what he literally says# then# he- ©ads with th©
loss of individuality.
Augustine m s familiar With both th© Isc^atowist. xgystielsm
add the Pauline mysticism. He finds th© same concept of _s©lf*lov©
which Flcino found in I©o~Plai©nisaa, and ho Joins th© Bros. of the
Neo«*platonists with th© Agape motif of Paul to create the CariMs
*Sm>ra« p# 90.

concept which became th© basis of Medieval thought. In th©
J& clvitatjg &gl. men tracing the opposition between th© kingdom of
Ood and the kingdom of mm, Angustino stresses emphatically that
self-love is th© root of all evil,. Butt he then 'notes that tills
refers only to a ni'alsew self-love seeidng its satisfaction in:
something other than Bod, in things temporal and transient. 'Thus
Augustine accepts self-love when fulfilled in God, rather than in
I
things of the world.
According to Augustine (and Aquinas also), man has the,
possibility of “love to God5* and can ©spend to the presence of God.
The Areopagii© went so far as to say that the ffros was more
3
divine than th© Agapp. Meo-platonism seems to b© the on©
philosophic school which Augustin© does not leave behind.
Augustine’s mysticism is ono in which the efforts of the individual
A
bring him into relationship with, th© deity. Augustine11©
mysticism then has th© elements of an ascending anabatic mysticism,
as was true of H o time.
In contradiction to Plotinus, Augustin© holds that
individuality is not lost in the mystical experience, for. the
distinction between God and man remains.
%f. Nygren, ££. cit.. pp. 709ff.
%4sl**

705*

% i d .. p. 413.
^Ibid,. ?f 106,
%arnaok, eg. cit.. p. 106.
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3. Lather's Mfstieism
Inther*s .nysticism As in contrast to Medieval Keo-platonized
tradition a descending* self-giving* mr^naXit^affiKning mysticism.
■Co understand Lutherf-s mysticism and its uniqueness in the Medieval
period as well as the resulting contribution to individuality is
to first discover his concept of God.
'-As t-re have indicated above -(pp. U2ff.), 4s He is in Bis
own nature and maje3ty, God is not knowable to man. God as shown
in Els Word (in which He chooses to reveal Himself) and God as
He As in His Majesty are two quite different things* God has‘an
inscrutable will which is not known to mans
The Diatribe is deceived by its own ignoranee in that
it makes no distinction between God preached and God
hidden* that is* between' the Word of God and God Himself
, . . we must keep in view U s Word and leave alone His
inscrutable wills for it is by His Ward, and not by His
inscrutable will that we must be guided;
3h any case who can direct himself according to a will
that is inscrutable and incomprehensible? ft As enough to ,
know that there is in God an Inscrutable will; what, why*
and within what limits It wills, it is wholly unlawful to
inquire, or wish to know or be concerned about, or touch
upon? we may only fear and adoret*
Luther then says that God is unknowable except through His
Word, by which he means His Agane. shown in the incarnation ®f...
Jesus Christ. Thus in Mthqr as in Paul, there is no Gpd-avsticism.
only ChrAst-mvsticlsm. (Sod is both tfeus pyelgtu^ and deua.-.
•^Cf. DAUenberger, gg. £&•» P* 191*

o

God known as he reveals himself.

1

The concept was hat: new.

It was not a novel doctrine in Luthor^s day that' there
was an inco^rehemslbl#;residue' of agnfasty, in God. Aquinas
recognised it, is can speak with some confidence concern^
ing what cannot M said of God,'feet can 'give little
4;
'to th# God-pieture, '.Mominalism denies
'even this negative description and asserts’the total
1iscomprehensibiiy of Godvs nature,and■will* .^sticism
claims an independent knowledge of God, hat derives its
.knowledge. at a level where all definitions dissolve.
fhe notion O f Beas ahpcondttas, the essence of the utter
heterogenity of the j&sfcse and. human realms,. th# logical &sm
sequences of' shifting responsibility .for the World to God* ha#
■
3
a.fourfold implication*'
a*: There is a boundary M m between th# 'View of faith and
-the rational world-view, ■ Jggm eanmst prsgiiji#

.arrange events

from.(fed*# noihfe. ^ .Viy* fhe ultimate relation Of man to
BOslity and' Being belongs to th# sphere @f faith* mot to th#
sphere of knowledge.
God-1# the absolute point •of referencei'.

**Ged is I# for

Whose .Will no cans# or ground, may be .laid down- as its rul# and
.standard! for nothing is m a level with it or above it*.,bat it
*
is.itself th# role for all- things.**
--%od who remains hidden.
2Sdgar M. Garlson, The Reinterqretatton of lather (Philadelphia*
Muhlenberg press*
% . Garlsoru m . cit. pp, i*t7f,
^Dillenberger, op, cit.. p. 199,

b*

tofi-

against every anttorepo-

oenirie-eudaemonistic way of thinking. It does not allow m m to
seek to interpret th® ways of God from the viewpoint of hie own
interest* ®o arrive at this view would be satisfying to man, but
it would mean that human standards had been applied to God*
Xuther is quoted as saying that if the divine character could
Justify itself before human standards, it would no longer be
1
divine. God’s responsibility and. justification are inherent
to an order-form of reality utterly heterogeneous to the human
domain*
c. lb© fieus absconditus of the complete righteousness of
God* even when Ms dealings with man offer no grounds for the
assertion* We may not be able to discern this inthe light of
nature or in the light of grace, but will find itclear in the
light of glory*
Ey the light of nature, it is Ine^lioabl©that it should
be just for the good to be afflicted and the bad to
prosper! but th© light of grace explains it* By the light
of grace it is inexplicable * * * Both the light of
nature and the light of grace here insist that the fault
lies not in the wretchedness of man, but in the injustice
of God* . * • But the light of glory insists otherwise,
and will one day reveal God, to whom alone belongs a
judgment whose justice is incomprehensible, as a God
whose justice is most righteous and evident.
Uuther’s recourse to the ’’light of glory” sews to indicate
1Xuth©r^ Works W.A. XVX2X, p. 645.14.
2Biliehberger* a&, elt*. p* 202.
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&mtrarily» the m m God reveals M s love# the.more ineompre~
hensibX© it ie seen to be* the m m Intense the correlative
experience of human freedom*

The fact is that the God. who is the Beue abscond!tus does
choose to reveal Himself in love to the individual*
Bhrtheavnore* X have the comfortable certainty that 2
please God* not by reason of the merit of w works* but
by reason of His merciful favour promised to me? so
that if t work toe little, or badly* He does not impute
it to me* but with fatherly compassion, pardons me and
makes me better.1
mystical experience of tether is thus a descending
mysticism* in which the One Comes down to show Himself, tether
speaks of his mystical experience m which he bases this concept.
God took pity £22.fi& and 1 saw the inner connection between
the two phrases, *fh© justice of God is revealed In the
Gospel*1 and M2h© just shall live by faith.® then 2 began
to understand that this ’'Justice of God*s is the righteous*
ness by which the Just man lives through the free gift
of God* that is “by faith®; and that the Rustic©
Revealed in the Gospel® is the passive Justice of God
by which he takes pity on us and Justifies us by our
faith* as it .is written “the Just"shall live by faith.®
thereupon I felt as if I had been bom again and had. .
entered paradise through vide~open gates. Immediately
the whole scripture took on a new meaning for me. * . »
Whereas the egression “Justice of God*1 had filled me
with all the m m love* And so this verse of Paul*s
became in truth the gate of Paradis© for me.2

pp. 199**.

t Road to Reformation (Philadelphia! Muhlenberg Press*
)* p. ill<

t2k

It 4s isqportant to Koto that it Is & descending wystietsia and
also a poys.onality»a£fiynaii^ mysticism* The Individual is not
absorbed or united with the One* Bather the individaal is "bom
again*1with new understanding and* as fritter later points oat*
this is communion with God, not union with God.
It is the Peas revelatus that solves for Lather the tension
between nearness and distance, between predestination and freedom.
Classical and Medieval Eysticlsm apeak of the nearness of
God and regard the absence of receptivity on the part of man as
the only hindrance to a complete union between man and God.
3h that union the individual is absorbed into the Jdl of divine
Being*

There is little room for divine transcendence. Realism

and nominalism stress the distance between man and God. They
meet only through the Church and the means of grace over which the
Church rules.
Luther as did Paul preserves both the immanence and
transcendence of God, antithetically to the nominalists. Kan does
not experience the naked power of God but God’s love. Luther
stresses the nearness of God at least as much as the mystics; "If
I have sinned, and all his is mine and all mine is his,*’* and
•’Hence all of us who believe in Christ are priests and kings
in Christ.1,2 Luther continues speaking of this relationship in
^Dilleriberger, gg. pit., p. 61.
2» ,

p. 63.

125

ffyaa^iom o f & C h ris tia n i

Wo conclude, therefore, that a Christian lives not In
himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor, etherise ho
Is not a Christian, He lives in Christ through faith,
in his neighbor through love. £y faith he is caught up
beyond himself into Cod*
love he descends beneath
himself into his neighbor. Tot he always remains 4h
Cod and in his love, as Christ says in Fohnl (*51),
“ T ru ly , tr u ly , I say to you, you w iH see heaven opened,
and th e angels o f God ascending and descending upon th e
Son o f man.” *

In spite of this stress on the oneness of man and Cod In and
through Christ, the human and the divine are never allowed to
melt together as in unionwaysticisa. the fellowship is one in
which individuality is affinned; Iht other words, according io:
lather, the religious experience, and its inevitable positing
of predestination, entails the correlative experience of
individual freedom in the world.
The n o tio n o f a “hidden God* guarantees human freedom}
human freedom, in tu rn guarantees th e o yste ry o f p re d e stin a tio n .
For the fa ith fu l, human freedom p o in ts to th e K ystery so fa r as
fa ith experiences Grace.

The consciousness o f the d iffe re n c e

between man and God is sharpened by the m ystica l experience,

la th e r

asserts both the nearness o f God and the distance from-Him w ith o u t
any sense o f c o n flic t between th e two.
Ib is is possible fo r In th e r because he stresses th e aspect

*Ibld.. p. 80.
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(e.g.* to a demiurge) or erven to creation ex nihilo— and the world
is the context in which tomm liberty is to be studied. bith
lather, this whole structure of referral is radically changed*
fhe referral back to m artisan, producer or creator is, taking
the term widely, a “causal'* referral— i.e., a “causal** relation
of some kind or other, thus, man, the individual, is linked to
the world and its origin in a “causal** way— e.g., a case in point
being Augustinian predestination, or even neo-HIatonio absorption
into the One, $ust to mention only two facets of this ltcausalH
referral,
As a consequence, the origin possesses a perfection lack to
the world# subordinated to. it. IMs subordination takes many forms,
but essentially it consists ofs (1) total dependence of the
world on God, or a cosmic force and, (2) the workings of the
world as cooperative imitation of the workings of a divine realm..
fhe various attempts to understand individual freedom have been
1
understood in this framework. A good case is Cusanus who goes
about as far as one can within this framework in affirming
Individual freedom while still postulating a creator-God, who is
the Cause of everything.
■In contradistinction, Inther significantly and radically
overcomes this "causality** with his concept of a “self-giving** world*
1

Supra, p. 101.

129

disregarding the producer or creatojvGod by focusing attention
on, Agape and the Hlcej and here God becomes “hidden,f* the world
devolving

m mm

as fo r him .

It is here that luther contributes to a new concept of
the world, disregarding, even overcoming the “causal0 referral
to a producer or creator*1 Correlatively, we have a new concept
of the individual$ man acquires a new functional significance
within the whole; 3hdeed# the very elimination of “causal*
referral demands that the individual be conceived in a functional,
rather than “causal0 relation to the world and God* Hie old
relation of part (man, individual, effect) to the whole (world,
producer or creator~God, cause) falls apart# Hie functional
significance transforms and bestows on man a new freedom.
The Gestalt theory may be suggestive in illustrating lather*s
notion of man* Gestalt* s theory rejects traditional attempts to
“reduce1* the whole to its parts, nor does it advocate that the
whole is prior in regard to the parts*
Gestalt theory replaces the traditional conception of
parts end wholes in terms of elements by a functionalistic
conception. Parts are defined as constituents or.
‘hijole-parts*0 They are conceived of as essentially
determined and qualified by functional;significance which
they have with respect to each other and, hence, for the
whole of the Gesialt-coterfcur© into which they are
integrated. The whole is accordingly considered as the
equilibrated and balanced coexistence of its functional i

Infra, pp. 132ff.
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human life became affected*
Cassirer cites fcarburg in his «orfc on Xnther to indicate
the asfcxclo^iccl ideas in the- Bsnaiseeiiee®
vie are in til© age of Faust* ‘
ffae racfic-ti scientist tries to
carve cut an intellectual realm for reflection between
b$m<££ and the object— a realm located :o vthere between
magical practi.ee end cosnolo^Lcat math; ^-.tics* Athens once
again ramts to be free
iiXextmdri'-.* ’
$h© natural phllosopiy of the Renaissance had tried to find
« eci^te^lordcal foundation and justification of magic* Itagle*
he explains, assumes that subject and object were originally
one, and that on the basis of the identity of subject and object,
the Ego Kubjscts nature not only to its Intellect font also to
its will*2
Subject and object exist in a spatial relationship with
mutual and continuous Interaction* M m 9 the Igo, appears to
the world at once as the enclosing and the enclosed with both
aspects expressing his relationship to the cosmos* According to
Cassirer, the predicates formerly applying to *.r .iiae*s God
are now equally assignable to the human sou’..'
She ioformtion restated the Angustlnian proposition that
not %mturesibut God was the center of existence* ISan* as the

mi i m m

"’Vi'.• Ibid.j p* lyi*

ot&

fpoA-p^ep -jCn^»^9ox **

s© xesaoAitm oqq »tou

I

I

-&
%

*

.1

§
5

o

c*
S3*
©
3
®J

III

©

<
*
tr

Ift.

W

9
©
a

►**

H- 3
H
©

**
©

©

I >
* I

»

p
f
t
ta

o

f
b? e
< ?-*»

%

<*

a

S'

a

ft

I

a

P
§

a
eqq. <
4 jjouq sqc&

© Wf srgeg© qdoouoo ueprpqsttBiiy

♦e*f e*p©Q Si joqqsafl

<xo$ srntJd ©qj

*pt«?ra»p tfpmvt&p e st? «*©t&©a qnq psq.pn'j.ai eq oq

„qt®^S9SM © s© .roadd© qott soop jeqqo jo stvpxd spq|

♦i^psrEiqo© qnq

-ft

©

g

I I

I *

Hs

«►
fir
©
w

p

©

®

S

§

t
*
«

& \

I

I I

05

*r

Cfc o

H

p

o

©

H
&
s

ft

ST

I

f

©

g-

essence and exlsteneebf both.
lather begins his ontology with God as does Mgustino, but
in an ontology free from predestination. * The God who initiates
•the VferM, firne, and relationship, also is a loving Go'd (Ai^a»e)*
tfe© individual, in relationsMp to this aeane mrld then is
fro© to use each of these created and given aspects of existence.
He does not need to use thera even for salj*fulfillmentf for this
too has been a gift (justification by feitb}*What was required for self-reaHaation in Aagustinefs
^feltas of effort and abilities can now be used freely toward the
service of fellow men* H* Bichard Biebuhr says that*
Xniber understood that the self could not conquer selflove, bat ’that 'it was conquered when the self found its •■
security in God, m s delivered from anxiety and thus set
free to serve the neighbor self-for^etfUlly.2
the dyftsadc»e^»giving^rld of lather posits an individual
with the final freedom, namely, freedom from himself* She “fersoa**
of God gives lather*s individual relationship not to a scheme or:
hierarchy but another'Jenson, Ibis provides the possibility of
personality.

*Supra, p* 10b,
2H. Richard"KLetouhr, €hriat and Culture (lew lorkt Harper &
Bow forcbbook % I9&)t PP*
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As

m

have indicated in the introduction and later

demonstrated* any inquiry tats the freedom 61 the individual Is at
t o sons time an toulry into t o nature of t o eoatessh in w M e h t o
freedom

deem®*

Mthex^s contribtttion to to: concept of individual

liberty is found l» M s jjresentatioii Of t o nature of t o coatoast*

&. Chapter I through V, so noted in detail t o soys la
which t o individual see placed or Considered in a

I
causal view tot severely or Mthgetor Matted individual liberty*
lather*s contributions which are sigMftcant may be
swsarily fonamlated in three constructs of context which he
introduces to t o toaissaace world*
i. •
■t o individual is freed, from t o eosmolsgteal causal
context fey introducing t o individual not as.a creation of t o
cosmos hut rather of a **Free# or CtotoaMtod*' In ts*4«fcnod»cing
t o concept of m

nlM3^, creation Xntor has presented the

possibility of m individual idth freedom.. in individual t o is
subject to a Mghef power which Is not itself' free cannot have
freedom regardless of t o relationship between the two entities., -

iM m PP> 19-201 38-398 so, 35, 37-388 61, 62, 69, 73,

ei, 92, 96-95.

*35
fhue the A 3eistoteai.au 6od who is Himself the end result of a
•

(

* •

system of natural lien finds it ;in^osaible to grant a freedom
t&ieh la not S&s to give*
*

.«

;

1

Luther*3 construct of a God -uho is
;

1

•

•

prior to creation and not a subject provides the initial premise
for the 'free individual*1

Z* fbe individual-is at liberty v&tbln the context of the
CreatoiMlod by the est^>lishmfint of the two realms of the human
and the I&vlne.

13m two orders are utterly heterogeneous* and

therefore the individual is not hound within a theelegleal-csueal
isomorphism by the Greater (3od»

Ibis provides an individual

freedom which .does not demand that the individual actu&liae his

<iOllve%hi
t •

lather’s demand for the utter heterogeneity between the
divine and human real Is the nest significant construct of
freedom of the Individual for it asserts that the individual is
• <

V

not only free from the cosmological causal context but ie also

3.

finally* the individual according to lather actualiees

his freedom in nuhh a way that he becomes more truly free*
*• ' •« . ‘
‘, ■1 * *:
»5‘
4 < • .1
lather’s ^stemologleal approach to the liberty ©* the
individual is through the framework of a mysticism in which
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